Economic Opening up of Russia: Establishment of New EU-RF Trade Relations in View of EU Eastern Enlargement by Paulina Pospiezna
 
UNIVERSITY OF WUPPERTAL  












Economic Opening up of Russia: 










Europäische Wirtschaft und Internationale Wirtschaftsbeziehungen 
















Economic Opening up of Russia: 












Herausgeber/Editor: Prof. Dr. Paul J.J. Welfens, Jean Monnet Chair in European Economic 
Integration  
 
EUROPÄISCHES INSTITUT FÜR INTERNATIONALE WIRTSCHAFTSBEZIEHUNGEN (EIIW)/ 
EUROPEAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 
Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Campus Freudenberg, Rainer-Gruenter-Straße 21,  
D-42119 Wuppertal, Germany 
Tel.: (0)202 – 439 13 71 





JEL classification: F10, F13, F15, F40 
Key words: EU-Enlargement, trade policy, Russia 
 Abstract The EU’s economic co-operation and political dialogue with Russia take place in 
many spheres touching the Kaliningrad issue, WTO membership, a war against terrorism, 
energy dialogue, and the consequences of the EU Eastern Enlargement that took place in May 
2004. Undoubtedly, the European Union and the Russian Federation have also an important 
trade relationship. The interest of both parties in maintaining and strengthening this co-
operation is even more important because of the EU Enlargement as they are now direct 
neighbours. The aim of the research was to look into the question how the EU Enlargement 
would influence Russia’s opening up as well as its trade relations with the EU-25 with special 
focus on EU new members from Central and Eastern Europe. The paper has complex contents 
and present the subject in broad perspective. First chapter gives the theoretical base (theory of 
trade creation and diversion) on which analysis on current developments were made. The 
second describes the economic situation in Russia and its opening-up for trade. The third 
chapter gives detailed background of EU-Russian bilateral economic relations supported by 
statistical data. Furthermore, the existing trade regime and current changes in EU- Russia 
trade regime were described and analyzed. The fourth chapter describes thoroughly the 
process of the European integration generally, what it means for the new members and non-
members in order to show the complexity of the EU Eastern Enlargement. The possible 
consequences of the EU Enlargement on EU-Russia and CEE countries – Russia trade 
relations are presented further. Then, in the end of the paper hypothesis is discussed that the 
establishing a Common European Economic Space (CEES) between the EU and Russia is a 
condition for overcoming any negative effects of Enlargement for both sides.By studying this 
subject it was hoped to shed some new light on the EU-Russia relations, presented fresh 
approaches and contribute some new results which in turn will call for some reassessment of 
what has already been done in the EU-Russia relations. Research was based on government 
and diplomatic documents, papers statistical data, solid expertise and broad cross-section of 
economists' opinion and other specialized publications or field interviews found on English, 
Polish and Russian web sites, in books and newspapers. 
 
 
Zusammenfassung: Die wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und der politische Dialog zwischen 
der EU und Russland findet auf vielen Felder statt, u.a. im Zusammenhang mit dem Status des 
Kaliningrader Gebietes, der WTO-Mitgliedschaft, Terrorismusbekämpfung, 
Energieversorgung und den Konsequenzen des EU-Beitritts der am 1. Mai 2004 vollzogen 
wurde. Zweifelsohne pflegen die Europäische Union und Russland wichtige 
Handelsbeziehungen. Das Interesse beider Parteien am Erhalt und der Intensivierung der 
Kooperation ist auch deswegen von wachsender Bedeutung, weil die beiden nach der 
Erweiterung nun direkte Nachbarn sind.Das Ziel dieses Diskussionbeitrages ist es, ein Blick 
darauf zu werfen, wie die EU-Erweiterung Russlands Öffnung beeinflussen und seine 
Handelbeziehungen zu den Ländern der EU-25 verändern wird besondern im Hinblick auf die 
neuen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten in Mittel- und Osteuropa.Im ersten Kapitel wird eine theoretische 
Basis für die Analyse der gegenwärtigen Entwicklungen gegeben (Theorie der 
Handelsschaffung und der Handelsumlenkung). Das zweite beschreibt die wirtschaftliche 
Situation Russlands und seine Öffnung in Bezug auf den Handel. Das dritte Kapitel liefert 
einen detaillierten Hintergrund der bilateralen wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen auf Basis von 
statistischen Daten. Das vietre Kapitel beschreibt den Prozess der europäischen Integration im 
Allgemeinen und nimmt Bezug auf seine Bedeutung für die neuen Mitglieder und Nicht-
Mitglieder. Zum Ende wird diskutiert, ob die Schaffung eines Gemeinsamen Europäischen 
Wirtschaftsraumes (GEWR) zwischen der EU und Russland eine Voraussetzung für die 
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1. Introduction  
Enlarging European Union Eastwards 
On May 1st 2004, ten countries became members of the European Union: Cyprus, the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and 
Slovenia. Objective is to welcome Bulgaria and Romania as the EU members in 2007 
(EUROPEAN COMISSION 2004). 
The Eastern Enlargement, which is fifth enlargement of the European Union, is one of 
the most important opportunities for the EU and for Central and East European (CEE) 
countries at the beginning of the 21
st century. It is a unique, historic task to further the 
integration of the continent by peaceful means, extending a zone of stability and prosperity to 
new members. According to the European Comission’s (EC) estimates, the benefits of 
enlarging the Union to include these countries are political, economic, and cultural: 
•  The addition of more than 100 million people, in rapidly growing economies, to the 
EU’s market of 370 million will boost economic growth and create jobs in both old 
and new member states. 
•  There will be a better quality of life for citizens throughout Europe as the new 
members adopt the EU policies for protection of the environment and the fight against 
crime, drugs and illegal immigration. 
•  The arrival of new members will enrich the EU through increased cultural diversity, 
interchange of ideas, and better understanding of other peoples. 
•  The Enlargement will strengthen the Union’s role in world affairs – in foreign and 
security policy, trade policy, and the other fields of global governance. 
The economic analyses of the Commission maintained that benefits were visible in 
candidate countries even before the Enlargement (EUROPEAN COMISSION 2003): 
•  In Central and Eastern Europe, stable democracies had emerged, with democratic 
institutions and increased respect for minorities.  
•  The economic reforms in these countries had led to high rates of economic growth 
(higher than the EU) and better employment prospects. 
•  This process had been helped and encouraged by the prospect of the EU membership, 
and by the EU’s financial assistance. 
•  As a result the Union enjoyed growing trade with these countries (€ 17 billion trade 
surplus in 2000), and this generated employment and growth in the member states. 
Numerous economic analyses have concluded that the benefits of the Enlargement will 
outweigh the costs. Although the benefits are relatively larger for the new member-countries, 
because they start from a lower economic base (their economies represent only about 6% of 
the GDP of EU-15), there are gains for both sides. Moreover, the new members, already 
exposed to the challenge of globalisation, will help the Union to surmount it. 
From economical point of view the process of the Enlargement generally means an 
expansion of European Union’s market and the opening of previously closed CEE countries 
markets by removing existing trade barriers. It should be recognized, furthermore, that the 
creation of a single European Union’s market is automatically linked with closure toward 
those companies and economic actors operating from non-member countries who cannot  
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directly refer to the laws and liberties granted within the single market. Therefore, before 
reviewing these consequences, it will be instructive first to base them on the theoretical 
benefits and costs of economics integration, to which I will refer many times in my paper.  
 
Theory of Economic Integration 
There are following stages of international economic integration: 
•  A free trade area is established when a group of countries abolishes restrictions on 
mutual trade but each member country retains its own tariff and quota system on trade 
with third countries. An industrial free trade covers only trade in industrial products 
while a full free trade area includes all products. 
•  A custom union is created when a group of countries removes all restrictions on 
mutual trade and also sets up a common system of tariffs and quotas with respect to 
third countries. A custom union becomes a common market with the removal of all 
restrictions on the movement of productive factors-labour, capital, and enterprise.  
•  The completion of the final stage of economic union involves a full integration of the 
member economies with authorities responsible for economic policymaking. In 
particular, an economic union requires a single monetary system and central bank, a 
unified fiscal system, and a common foreign economic policy.  
Because the international economic integration involves both free trade among its member 
countries (liberalization) and, at the same time, restrictions on imports from non-member 
or third countries (protection), it has both positive and negative effects. A positive effect 
occurs when the elimination of internal tariffs and other barriers stimulates new trade among 
the member countries that does not displace third-country imports. That is to say, the customs 
union induces a shift from a high-cost producer inside the union to a lower cost producer also 
inside the union. This positive effect is called trade creation. On the other hand, a negative 
trade effects occurs when member countries now buy from each other what they formerly 
bought from third countries. Known as trade diversion this negative effect results from 
a shift from a lower producer outside the union to a higher cost producer inside the union 
(see: statistic analyses in Appendix 1). 
On one side, third countries may significantly benefit from an enlarged Union. A single 
set of trade rules, a single tariff, and a single set of administrative procedures were applied not 
only just across the existing Member States but across the Single Market of the enlarged 
Union. This may simplify dealings for third-country operators within Europe and improve 
conditions for investment and trade. On the other side, economic integration may declines 
trade between the members and the outsider and worsens its terms of trade. However, it is 
difficult and also to early to estimate and predict now what real economic consequences it has 
on the third countries. Therefore, it is obvious that the impact of this Enlargement as 
economic integration of CEE countries with the EU on Russia, which will stay outside the 
EU, its economy and EU-Russia trade relations is nowadays a controversial question and rise 
many doubts. They are strengthened by the fact that since Lithuania and Poland are members 
of the EU, the Russian enclave – Kaliningrad - became an island surrounded on all land 
borders by a totally different, political, economic and military entity.  
The EU and Russia should, therefore, develop closer cooperation and new trade relations 
in order to compensate any negative effect connected with the Eastern Enlargement and to 
prevent any crowding-out of Russia.  3 
In the framework of my paper, I would like to look into the question how the process of 
the EU Enlargement may influence Russia’s future trade and its economic opening up and 
what measurement should be undertaken to offset any negative impact on country’s economic 
growth and productivity and help to strengthen EU-Russia trade relations. The paper then will 
discuss the option of establishing Common European Economic Space (CEES) as an adequate 




2.  Making Russia’s Economy More Open 
Developing and CIS countries with Russia are becoming closely linked to the global 
economy. This process affects development of market integration, interdependence among 
countries, provides opportunities to exploit country’ comparative advantages. Nevertheless 
the main aims of transition: trade liberalization, effective privatisation and macro 
stabilisation have not been fully achieved in Russia. M. Porter considers that most 
developing countries are at the first stage of development and building comparative 
advantages in labour-intensive and natural resource-intensive goods. Further progress in 
providing reforms can be ensured via restructuring, and privatising of key enterprises in 
reorganising banking sector, investing in capital-intensive branches. The openness of the 
country is closely connected with the development of well-functioning market-based 
institutions, an efficient state management of public business and the guarantee of property 




2.1 Economic  Development 
2.1.1  GDP and Industrial Production 
Russia has made considerable progress in achieving macroeconomic stabilisation. In period 
between the fall of the Soviet Union and the severe 1998 financial crisis, GDP and standards 
of living declined dramatically, social security worsened, while poverty levels rose markedly. 
After the financial crisis the devaluation of the rouble, which boosted demand for local 
production, successful macroeconomic stabilisation polices and unexpectedly high world 
energy process, brought about a recovery. GDP rebounded in 1999, increasing by 5.4% and 
accelerated to a 9% annual rate in 2000, as the economy benefited from a further sharp 
increase in oil prices. 
Nevertheless, according to Federal State Statistics Service ( Rosstat) estimates GDP 
decelerated to around 5% in 2001 and to 4.7 % in 2002 also mainly in a context of lower oil 
prices and worsening world economy, what may give the assumption that the Russian 
economy is operating below its potential and the current growth mechanism is not sustainable 
in the long term.  
However, after this slowdown in growth, the economy in 2003 grew at impressive rated 
estimated at 7.3%, which brings GDP at current prices to 13.3 trillion rubles. This tendency 
was followed also in the first half of 2004 when GDP increased by estimated 7.4%, with the 
slowdown observed in the third quarter of 2004. Nevertheless, growth of more than 7% in  
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2003 and in first half of 2004 brought the cumulative expansion since the depth of the 1998 
crisis to about 39.4% (WORLD BANK 2004).  
For the first time in a long time, in 2003 growth was driven by investment. Industrial 
production grew at 7% (compared to 3.7% in 2002) and services growing at 7.4 % (5.5%). 
The increase was observed in natural recourses sector as well as in domestic manufacturing. 
Although growth of the natural resource sectors exceeds growth of domestic manufacturing, 
there has been reported increase in activities outside the natural resource sectors and it 
appears as if manufacturing ‘caught up’ a little in 2003. Overall jump in the growth rates  of 
domestic manufacturing was driven by its sub-sector, namely machine building.  
These positive trends that appeared in 2003 have also carried in 2004 (Table 1). However, 
while in 2003 the manufacturing sector outpaced significantly resource-based industries, in 
2004 was reported slowdown in non-resources branches of industry (WORLD BANK 2004). 
 
Table 1 :Growth in Resource and Manufacturing Industries (%) 
  1999  2000  2001 2002 2003  2004  –  9M 
Non-ferrous  metals  10.0  15.0  4.9 6.0 6.2  3.6 
Ferrous metals  17.0  16. 0  -0.2  3.0  8.9  5.2 
Fuel and energy  2.4  5.0  6.1  7.0  9.3  7.7 
Wood and processing  18.0  13.0  2.6  2.4  1.5  3.6 
weighted  average  9.3  10.4  4.2 5.5 7.8  6.0 
Electricity  -1.0  1.8  1.6 -0.7 1.0  0.2 
Chemical  24.0  15.0  5.0 1.6 4.4  7.9 
Machine  building  17.0  20.0  7.2 2.0 9.4 12.7 
Construction  materials  10.0  13.0  5.5 3.0 6.4  5.9 
Light industry  12.1  21.0  5.8  -3.4  -2.3  -5.9 
Food  4.0  14.0  8.4 6.5 5.1  4.4 
Weighted average  10.6  14.3  6.3 2.5 5.6  6.7 
Source: Rosstat (2004), Russian Economic Report no 9, www.worldbank.org.ru 
 
Russia’s dependence on the oil price was slightly slipping since the end of 2002, but still 
strong (GAVRILENKOV 2004) and cannot be ignored. Russia’s high growth continues to be 
dependent on high prices of oil. The price for Russian oil increased from an average of 21 to 
24 USD per barrel or by 15 % over the course of 2003, with a peak in the run up to the Iraq 
war. It is historically proved, that Russia has never grown faster than 5.5% without an 
increase in the price of oil. Therefore, Russia’s growth depends of this factor (WORLD 
BANK 2004). The direct independence between oil price and export value in years 2000-2003 
shows further Table 3. 
The oil bonus also continued to increase the consumption of non- tradables and so helped 
to modify the structure of GDP further from manufacture of goods to the production of 




Table 2 :Changes in GDP Structure (%) 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003  Growth  in  1999-2003 
GDP    100  100  100  100  100  38.2 
Production of goods  45.2 45.0 42.9 40.3 40.2  46.5 
Production of services  54.8 55.0 57.1 59.7 59.8  28.3 
 market services    46.0  46.6 48.0 50.0 49.0  32.8 
non-market services  8.9    8.4    9.1    9.7  10.8    7.4 
Source: Rosstat (2004), Russian Economic Report no 7, www.worldbank.org.ru  
 
High growth in 2003 and in the first half of 2004 and some structural changes that became 
recently visible can be explained not only by oil high prices but also by the fact that there are 
more and more enterprise founded after the start of systemic reform and growing up under 
competitive conditions. The macroeconomic performance already in 2002 clearly indicated 
that the country can no longer rely on the advantages of ‘easy’ growth and repeat the same 
growth pattern which emerged after the 1998 crisis. A rapid rise in incomes in recent years 
has shifted consumer demand toward higher-quality goods that could not yet be produced in 
Russia. Domestic manufacturers throughout the market, therefore, realized that to compete 
with imports, they need to offer better products, which means they need to invest in new 
productive capacities. (GAVRILENKOV 2004). Nevertheless, the decline in manufacturing 
industries and the overall slow in growth the third quarter of 2004 only confirmed that there 
are some obstacles that unable manufacturers to develop their businesses. Among such 
barriers are mentioned very often: increasing competitive pressure in manufacturing from 
imports and rising domestic costs as well regulatory uncertainty. 
 
2.1.2 Capital  Investment 
The relatively low oil price in 2002 has affected capital investment in the fuel and energy 
sector directly. Since investment in this sector accounts for approximately 50 % of all 
investment this, by itself, may have impaired the rest of the economy. Moreover, the real 
appreciation of the ruble between 1995 and 1998 seriously undermined the competitiveness of 
industries other than energy and non-natural resources, discouraging investment in such 
industries. Although the rouble’s devaluation in 1998 has improved the competitiveness of 
sectors other than energy and natural resources, it has sill not entailed any significant 
investment flows to these sectors. The obvious reason for this that investment in such sectors 
depends on longer-term expectations concerning the development of the real exchange rate of 
the rouble.  
However, in 2003 there was a significant rise in the investment activity of enterprises and 
organisations. According to Rosstat, fixed investment increased by 12.5%, compared with 
2.6% in 2002. The most considerable economic development in 2003 is that the economy 
finally experienced a significant increase in investment demand. (WORLD BANK 2004). The 
major factor of growth in fixed capital investment in 2003 was also due to the improved 
financial standing of enterprises in many sectors, including the export-oriented industries, 
which accounted for a large portion of total investment. In the first quarter of 2004 the 
investment grew even at faster rates comparing with the same period of 2003.  
Nevertheless, it is with respect to investment data that disagreements between optimists 
and pessimists are most pronounced. The assessment depends on which enterprise segment 
one looks at. Disaggregating the statistical evidence suggests (i) accelerating investment  
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growth in services and several “new” sectors; (ii) decelerating investment growth in domestic 
“old’ industries; and (iii) less linkage between investment in the oil and gas sector and price 
increases than previously (because current high energy prices are not expected to last). 
 
2.1.3 Inflation 
Russia has made considerable attempt in reducing inflation in the past several years, largely 
through the adoption of sensible fiscal and monetary policies. (GLOBAL INSIGHT 2004). 
According to Rosstat estimates, consumer price inflation registered at 9.3% for the first 
ten months of 2004 and is likely to exceed the annual target of 10%. The pace, however, has 
been slower in 2004 than in 2003 despite much higher current account inflows from high oil 
prices and a less restrictive monetary policy. 
 
2.1.4  Exchange Rate and Foreign Trade 
The sharp appreciation of the Euro against the US dollar in the second half of 2002 caused 
Russia’s effective real exchange rate (REER) to depreciate by 0.7%, the first real depreciation 
since 1998. In 2003 the ruble’s real value against the USD increased by 19% (WORLD 
BANK 2004). With the lion’s share of exports (such as oil) denominated in USD and a 
significant share of imports coming from the Euro-zone, an appreciation in the exchange rate 
of the Euro versus the USD depreciates the ruble’s real exchange rate: it makes imports more 
expensive and lowers the value of exports.  
Fortunately, for Russia manufactures, much of the competition in domestic markets is 
from goods denominated in euro, and they are benefiting from the euro’s constant 
strengthening and this trend seems to continue (GLOBAL INSIGHT 2004)   
International trade in 2003 was characterized by substantially increased export and import 
values. While export growth was driven by very high prices for Russia’s main export goods 
(increase in the price of oil), import growth resulted from the continuing real appreciation of 
the ruble combined with rapid increase in real income and purchasing power (WORLD 
BANK 2004).  
 
Table 3 :Russia’s Trade (USD billion) and Crude Oil Price (USD/barell) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 
Export  105.6 101.9 107.6 134.4 
Import    44.9    53.8    61.0    74.8 
Trade Balance    60.7    48.1    46.6    59.6 
Crude oil price     24.0    20.9    21.0    24.0 
Source: Central Bank of Russia (2004), www.cbr.ru 
 
In January – August in 2004 the term of trade with foreign countries were even better than 
in the same period last year owing to a more rapid growth in export prices. Exports expanded 
27.3% in January-August 2004 compared to the same period last year, to 109.7 USD billion 
against 86.2 USD billion in January-August 2003. Export growth was mainly due to a rise in 
the contract prices of major export commodities – oil and gas, the price for which exceeded 
35 USD/barrel in 2004, as well as due to the overall growth in export volumes. Imports, 
however increased 24.8% in that period year on year to stand at 58.5 USD billion against  
46.9 USD billion in January-August 2003. Growth in imports was largely due to the increase 
in the value of investment goods such as machinery, equipment and transport vehicles. 
(CENTRAL BANK OF RUSSIA 2004). 7 
2.1.5 Growth  Prospects 
Despite observed overall positive facts, there are facts that are not optimistic for Russia’s 
growth, the reason for that is that increases in export values are almost completely based on 
international price increases for such goods, what means that the growth of the Russian 
economy relies mainly on evolution of world market prices, which entails significant 
exposure to potential fluctuations and crises in those segments (BANK OF FINLAND 2002). 
Consequently, the falling prices of fuels and raw materials or discrepancy of overestimated 
exchange rate ruble to US dollar may undermine Russia’s economic growth -which is a key 
question for all transition countries, especially for those which have a major budget deficit 
and foreign debt problem. The point can be confirmed, for example, by the fact that the rise in 
oil price over 1999-2000 contributed to higher profits for oil companies, which in turn meant 
growing investment. Similarly, a fall in the oil price in 2002 resulted in a drop in investment 
and hence industrial output what was described earlier. 
This fact can be explained by the theory of trade policy. According to this theory, terms 
of trade – a measure of the trading success of a country by comparing the prices of its 
imports with the prices of its exports- is better for developed than for developing countries. 
The reason for that is that developed countries export mainly manufacturing products whereas 
developing countries raw materials. 
Generally, as table at the next page indicates, if export prices rise faster than import 
prices, terms of trade are said to improve. A fall in the exchange rate will have an 
unfavourable effect on the terms of trade. Therefore, countries like Russia whose growth is 
mainly powered by the export, which is resource oriented and includes oil, natural gas and 
other raw materials (chemical commodities, timber, fish products, non-ferrous metal, and 
wasted materials) will never have higher and, what is more important, sustainable capital 
inflows in long term. 
 
Terms of trade of countries who export raw 
materials 
 
Terms of trade of countries who export 
manufacturing products 
a)  if demand on the world market rises, this 
measure will fall, because: 
-  prices of exported goods (raw 
      materials etc) rise slowly 
-  prices of imported goods rise fast 
 
a)  demand on the world market rises, this 
measure will rise, because: 
-  prices of exported goods  rise fast 
-  prices of imported goods rise slowly 
 
b)  if demand on the world falls this terms of 
trade will also fall, because: 
-  prices of exported goods fall fast. 
-  prices of imported goods fall slowly 
b)  if demand on the world falls this factor also 
will rise, because: 
-  prices of exported goods fall slowly 
-  prices of imported goods fall fast 
Source: Author 
 
The fact is, what already mentioned, that Russian economy remains extraordinary 
dependent on the energy sector and other production of raw and semi-processed commodity 
exports as a source of growth. (GLOBAL INSIGHT 2004). The boost in oil prices that 
accompanied the run-up to the U.S-led military operations in Iraq sharply re-accelerated 
Russian economic growth in the first half of 2003 and launched an investment boom as the 
financial situation of Russian enterprises improved dramatically compared with a year earlier 
(GLOBAL INSIGHT 2004). However, the manufacturing sector largely suffers from the lack 
of investment which leave it internationally uncompetitive. Russian manufacturers have 
particularly suffered from competition of exports in the home market. Therefore, the priority 
of Russian trade policy should be to promote the development of those sectors that have the  
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potential to growth and which are not vulnerable to terms-of-trade shocks e.g. science-
intensive sub-sectors (pharmaceuticals, computers, aerospace, etc.) and specialised supplier 
sub-sectors (compressors, furnaces, agricultural tractors, machine-tools, weapon and 
ammunition, television and radio transmitters and receivers etc.). Among the market-economy 
countries Russia has the lowest share of textile, leather and clothing products in export. 
RECEP Comparative analysis of the development of manufacturing exports to the European 
Union from 1993 to 2002 shows a generally poor performance by Russia. Such fact may 
underline the importance of maintaining solid macroeconomic policies and continuing the 
implementation of radical economic reforms-which despite natural resource prices are 
nowadays the most important factors that determine Russia’s growth over the medium term 
(RECEP 2002).  
Taking account of the fact that growth in Russia is still dependent on commodity prices 
and continued reform implementation, World Bank Russia Office depicted four possible 
scenarios of Russia’ growth in 2003-2010: 
•  Scenario 1 – high natural resource prices, continued reform implementation 
•  Scenario 2 - high natural resource prices, lack of reform implementation 
•  Scenario 3 – low natural resource prices, continued reform implementation 
•  Scenario 4 – low natural resource prices, lack of reform implementation 
The resulting scenarios are suggestive in that they show four distinct patterns, and they 
show how reform implementation becomes the critical factor in attaining high growth rates. 
As figure 7 indicates, both scenario 1 and 3 have accelerating growth rates that will merge 
toward 2010, despite a considerable difference in the underlying oil price. On the other 
extreme, even with high oil prices throughout the period but without the benefit of continued 
reform implementation, growth rates in scenario 2 declines from 3.2% in 2003 to slightly 
more than 1% in 2010. Scenario 4, with low oil prices and no reform implementation is not 
depicted in figure 3, but would simply be below all others. 
 




Source: World Bank Russia Office (2003), www.worldbank.org.ru 9 
However, according to estimates of World Bank Russia Office, even in the most 
favourable environment, with oil price at 23 USD/bbl and continued reform implementation, 
Russia would require a 17% increase in fixed capital investment annually to grow at 5.2% on 
average from 2002 to 2010. Without continued reform implementation but with continued 
high oil prices, capital investment grows much lower, at 8.1% on average, and average growth 
will not exceed 2.5%. 
To sum up - the results indicate that Russia’s growth is driven by the quality of reform 
implementation rather than natural resource prices. Long term growth rates substantially 
above 5% appear unlikely to materialize in the immediate future and will require investment 
flows of an exceptional order of magnitude, which can only be realized if reforms succeed in 
reversing capital outflows and Russia’s current negative foreign investment position. The key 
areas of reform are thus measures to improve the investment environment and to allow for the 
return of Russian capital. Successful reforms - imposing hard budget constraints on 
communities, enterprises and natural monopolies, and improving the investment environment 
- will influence productivity and growth by attracting more capital into investment. If this 
happens, the economy benefits not only from increased volume of investment but productivity 
growth will accelerate because of the quality improvements associated with this new 
investment.  
Therefore, if we consider that the factors, that have negative impact on dynamics of 
majority macroeconomic indicators, cannot be outweigh at present by, so-called, ‘the increase 
factors’ implemented in Russian economy after crisis in 1998, the situation does not seems to 
be so dramatic. It means than that thus economic growth, nota bene bringing cumulative post-
crisis growth to more than 39% in 2004, results in large part from adaptation of Russian 
enterprises to market economy stimulated by actions and measurements taken by 
Governments (reforms) and changes in monetary policy of Central Bank.  Part of these 
undertakings has long-term character and will have influence on economic development also 
in future. What means further - Russia is well positioned for further growth and to be 




2.2  Russia’s Opening-Up for Trade 
For Russia and CIS countries the challenge of transformation includes the necessity to open 
up for trade and international investment (WELFENS 1999). Considering the huge size of 
Russia, its economy is rather open (compared e.g. with the US). But from the point of view of 
its GDP, it is clear that the country is not open as it could be. If we consider the number of 
enterprises involved in foreign trade, technical protection or customs process and duties, 
Russia is still not open economy.  
Generally, foreign trade policy is divided on export substitution or import substitution 
kinds of policies. The export substitution policy is based on the expansion production of 
exported good of the country, which leads to the aggravation of trade conditions in favour of 
trade partners. The import substitution policy may expand the country’s import of good, 
which lead to the improvement of trade conditions in the country toward trade partners. As a 
result, the better trade conditions appear in the country, and they become worse for trade 
partners. The investment stimulation into import substitution policy promotes the domestic 
production, decreases relative import prices, and rises the relative export prices.   
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The foreign trade policy in transition countries is mainly focused on providing growth of 
export products in the foreign markets, improvement the access of these goods to convertible-
currency markets, increasing the share of competitive products in total volume of export, 
stimulating the increase of export revenues. Studies support the export-enhancing policy, but 
emphasize difficulties in implementation it in practice.  
The theory of trade policy states that the government can use different instruments of 
trade regulation: tariffs, quotas, subsidies, and duties. The negative role of import tariffs is 
shown in the drop of world trade, in the increase of tax burden for customers, in the blast of 
country’s export, in the reduction of total level of employment. The positive side of protective 
tariffs or non-tariff e.g. quantitative bans/restrictions regarding specific industries is that they 
protect infant industry, stimulate domestic production and are significant source of budget 
incomes. Although most of experts agree that the protection of domestic market from 
undesirable imports and lowering competitiveness of imported goods strengthen the country’s 
trade position, some of them regard this expedient convenient only in a short run. In their 
opinion the protection of infant industries is suggested in the initial stages of development, 
because after the period of protection, industries become competitive and assistance is no 
longer needed. These measures correspond to the need to develop a policy to sustain 
competitive advantages.  
The traditional trade theories of comparative advantages, production costs, provided 
the choice of domestic goods production instead of purchase of foreign goods on the basis of 
comparing competitive advantages. The basic approach regards FDI and trade complements, 
other is to consider FDI a substitute for trade. Some authors point out that local market 
oriented FDI has both trade substituting and trade promoting effects. Therefore, the 
reorientation toward export substitution policy should be directed mainly to export orientation 
activity of enterprises in highly technology branches with FDI. In countries, which are less 
successful in acquiring FDI in early stage of transition, and rely on Western Europe’s outward 
processing trade, the large proportion of exports is provided by unskilled labour-intensive 
products (Mc GETTIGAN 2002). This situation we can observe in Russia, where the main 
distinguished features of Russian export is resource specialization, which can be explained 
owing to the low competitiveness of domestic goods, inefficient policy of export stimulating, 
decreasing share if finished articles in total export value. According Eurostat data, the Russian 
share in the world foreign trade is not significant, in 2003 Russia’s exports share of total 
world exports was 2.3%, whereas import only 0.9% of total world imports (EUROSTAT 
2004). Moreover, the barter, especially with CIS countries, negatively affects on relative 
prices and development financial, banking sectors.  
However, the later experience of Central European countries shows that firms with foreign 
participation are more trade-intensive on average than domestic companies. Some sectors 
have become more export or trade-oriented as a result of the activity of enterprises with 
foreign capital. The structure of export changes from being dominated by raw resource and 
low-cost labour-intensive products in favour of capital-intensive and skill-intensive products, 
as it happened in transition countries. The investment in production of capital-intensive and 
skill-intensive products stimulates economic growth in production sector of economy 
(WELFENS 2002). 
The direction of change in trade composition toward capital intensive and technology-
intensive exports may lead to Russian’s increased participation in the international division of 
labour. The more an economy will be open in terms of exports relative to GDP, the easier it 
will be for country to generate foreign exchange earnings and service external debt payments 
(WELFENS 1999). 11 
The government already recognizes the necessity of strengthening the manufacturing 
sector in order to achieve self-sustaining growth, as well as the need for further reform and 
restructuring to lower obstacles for Small and Medium Enterprises and reduce the burden of 
taxation. Furthermore, acknowledged also that the goal it has set for economic growth can 
only be met by means of accelerated reform and restructuring (GLOBAL INSIGHT 2004). 
Most of the reforms were launched, but this did not yet guarantee a significant influence on 
Russia’s economy. Russia is still behind many East European countries with the 
implementation of reform (GAVRILENKOV 2004). 
The main barrier, however, in opening up, is Russia’s tariffs and non- tariffs in trade 
policy  (broad selection in Appendix 2). For example, the incomes from custom duties make 
up approx. 3.4% GDP in Russia. The Russian structure of state incomes from custom duties 
distinguishes from majority of countries. Three fourth of state incomes forms via the export 
tariff and one fourth-the import duties. The producer’s subsidies are considered more 
favourable method of import restriction in comparison with tariffs and quotas, because they 
bring smaller losses for national economy.  
Therefore, a first step of economic opening up should be elimination or transfer of tariffs 
and quantities restrictions on the import and export side into tariffs that are more efficient and 
have less negative welfare effects. Temporary tariff protection will give manufacturing 
industry more breathing space to prepare for full competition. Other experts suggest to set up 
the stepped custom duties, which should reflect the difference in the world and economic 
prices, because the absence of import duties results in the budget and custom losses. There are 
also arguments in favour of uniform tariffs. Tariff revenues could generate considerable 
government revenues in the medium term although it seems appropriate to reduce tariff rates 
in the long run.  
As it is commonly known, the elimination of trade barriers and development trade 
liberalization may bring access to FDI. Government policy of economic openness, 
dismantling of import and export barriers, foreign trade and FDI liberalization promote 
adjustment of domestic prices to world market prices. It results in decreasing prices on some 
domestic goods in case of saturation of their internal market, simultaneously increase of 
competitiveness of goods (NOSOVA 2000). Market determines necessity and profitability of 
production goods. The competition policy is the basis for creation and preservation industrial 
structure in economy in future. Searches of new kinds of competitive products, new markets, 
and production of new commodities force the competition among producers, affects the 
production costs reduction, and rise export revenues. So overall, the opening of Russia may 
help to increase the productivity of Russia’s companies by expanding markets, modernizing 
equipment, and providing information. This may lead then to diversification of the production 
and export structure of the Russian economy towards value-added manufactured goods 
(SAMSON 2002). Consequently, it expands the possibility of access to the world markets of 
competitive goods and finished articles, strengthens the competition and improves the balance 
of payments. The most reasonable way to achieving higher growth rates is to lower the entry 
barriers for businesses and to establish a better business climate aimed at reducing capital 
flight and attracting foreign capital, and thus rebuilding capital stock across the economy. 
Further, real appreciation should be also restrained. It is very important to emphasise that 
maintenance of the real exchange rate at an advantageous level does not only serve for short-
term stimulation of exports, but also for winning longer-term confidence of potential investors 
in a wide range o manufacturing industries whose competitiveness can be maintained on 
significant export markets. Nevertheless the creation of a good investment climate requires 
much more than maintenance of a favourable real exchange rate. Further deep reforms of the 
economy-improving laws and their enforcement in such varied fields as taxation and the  
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protection of property rights, developing the banking system and other institutions of financial 
intermediation, streamlining regional in the operation of markets, etc.- are also required 
(NOSOVA 2000).  
There is also another reason why Russia has to change its import and export tariffs. The 
main directions of Russian future membership to the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
which is for Russia nowadays the priority, are: the real foreign trade liberalization, free access 
to the European markets of high technologies, improvement tax, custom legislation, and 
infrastructure development. Russia first applied for accession to the GATT in 1993. The pace 
depends on negotiations and Russia's ability to implement the necessary reforms of its 
economic and trade systems to make them compatible with WTO rules, and to offer a 
commercially significant package of market access commitments in the fields of industrial 
goods, services and agriculture.  
The WTO members apply the rigid tariff restrictions for protection their domestic 
markets, for example the progressive increase of import tariffs adequate to the degree of 
processing of imported products. The economic restructuring is the basis for the future 
progressive development, and a condition for becoming Russia the member of WTO. The 
Russian membership in WTO will benefit to the most favourable trade regime for these 
countries, provide an access to the world mechanism for concluding the international 
transactions. The basic obstacles for foreign trade development in Russia, in the opinion of 
WTO, are the exchange rate regulation, which is directed at the necessity of getting licences 
on imported capital. The custom regulations are not stable, and not attractive for foreign 
investors. Foreign trade tax system does not affect producers in effective way, and stimulate 
tax collection. The procedure of getting product’s certificate is complicated. There is no 
mechanism of protection internal market against low quality products. 
However, progress has already been made, for example in the area of negotiations on 
industrial tariffs or of the adoption of new legislation covering Intellectual Property Rights, 
but more efforts are needed in other areas, such as services, to ensure that they also reach a 
level commensurate with the rights and obligations of existing WTO Members. Russia signed 
the  “Treaty on Economic Co-operation for 1998-2007” 27 February 1998, which is 
directed to unify tariff and tax policies, and to expand trade relations. Russian government 
reduced the maximum tariff rate from 30 to 20 per cent on some consumer goods in 1998 and 
later (Appendix 2), but nevertheless considerable differences exist between Russia and WTO 
members.  
The European Union, as Russia’s main trade partner, also recognises Russia's accession to 
WTO as a priority and sees the fundamental role that membership of the WTO can play in 
anchoring and solidifying Russia's economic reforms. Russia and the EU have come close to 
compromise in the talks on Russia’s accession to the WTO, but it is too early to speak about 
the final agreement on several outstanding issues. The fact is that a number of difficult issues 
remain. The EU wanted Russia to cut import tariffs on airplanes and cars and allow European 
finance firms to operate in the country. Russia and the EU still disagree on issues related to 
the natural gas market – domestic gas prices in Russia are lower than the costs. The price 
offered to European buyers is four to five times higher than to Russians, therefore, the EU has 
demanded that Russia raise its domestic gas prices to the international level (Prime-TASS 
new agency 2004). The Commission was also negotiating to gain access to the transit of gas 
across Russia and to get export duties reduced (GAZETA.RU 2004). There is a range of 
questions on tariffs and subsidies. Very sensitive issue at the negotiations is also the 
regulation of foreign banks' activities in Russia. 13 
Moreover, ratification by Russia the Kyoto Protocol on prevention of global warming is 
closely linked to WTO negotiations (GATEWAY 2004). A total of 120 countries have 
already signed the Kyoto Protocol, but only 32 have ratified it, and according to the terms of 
the agreement it could not enter into force without the signature of either Russia or the United 
States. On the last day of September, the Russian government recommended that the Duma 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Russia’s opinion concerning a 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol was negative stating that it may ruin the Russian economy. 
However, President Putin insisted on ratification, thus putting an end to years of discussion 
about whether the Protocol would help or hurt Russia. The EU claims that ratification of the 
protocol will not threaten the country's economic development. Moreover, it may significantly 
improves its reputation in the eyes of Western investors. What is also important by ratifying 
the document, Russia itself will have more weight to throw around in the next stage of 
negotiations coming in the next couple years (EXPERT 2004). 
The EU considers that its positions are reasonable in the light of the obligations Russia 
will undertake as a WTO Member. They take account of the future perspectives for a 
deepening relationship between the EU and Russia in the context of a Common European 
Economic Space and of the rights and commercial opportunities that Russia will get from all 
other WTO Members as a result of accession. Advantages stemming from Russia's accession 
to the WTO will be reciprocal. It will provide more stability and predictability, and better 
terms of access for EU businesses willing to export or establish in Russia. And, on their side, 
Russian exporters will have guaranteed channels of exports to all markets of WTO members. 
The EU, therefore, explicitly supports Russia's application for WTO membership.  
However, there are also negotiations with the USA and other countries that have to be 
finished. Many analysts are certain that Russia won’t join the WTO in the next three years. 
The most mentioned year that Russia may join the organization is  2007 (EKHO MOSKWY 
2004). 
With WTO accession is also connected also issue of granting Russia full  market 
economy status. Under the Joint Statement of the EU-Russia Summit of 29 May 2002, the 
European Union announced Russia market economy status. Russia was the first country to be 
transferred from the non-market to the transition economy category (July 1998), and is the 
first again to be transferred from the transition to the market economy category. Not even 
China (who is a WTO Member) has been transferred from the transition to the market 
category.  
With the classification of RF as a market economy, the EU meets a Russian request that 
had a political and a trade dimension. From a political point of view, the Russian side wanted 
to be considered on an equal footing with other major economies and to be recognised as a 
market economy following Russia’s significant efforts to reform its economy. From the point 
of view of trade, anti-dumping investigations will be based on own data from Russian 
companies while previously data from other countries were used. This ensures enhanced 
transparency and in many cases it will lead also to lower dumping margins. 
The EU announced market economy status for Russia before the USA. The EU decision 
was taken entirely on the merits: i.e., as soon as the minimum necessary reforms in the 
Russian economic and legal structures have taken place. Russian exporters should appreciate 
that they will be treated in the same way as exporters in other market economies, and that they 
have the obligation to comply with all the rules which apply - not more and not less. This 
includes the possibility that the EU will adjust costs or prices which are distorted by the lack 
of a functioning market. Furthermore, it should be underlined that the recognition of Russia as 
a market economy should facilitate the process of Russia’s accession to the WTO.  
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Recognition of Russia as a market economy underlines the substantial progress in economic 
reforms by Russia, and such reforms are a precondition for WTO accession. Therefore, such 
recognition should facilitate the process of Russia’s accession to the WTO, which is staunchly 




3.  EU-Russian Bilateral Economic Relationship 
Russia is already integrating its economy with the EU. The EU-15 represented Russia’s 
largest trade partner, accounting for 61% of Russia’s imports and 61.9% of its export trade in 
2003(THE EC DELEGATION IN RUSSIA, 2004). It should increase almost to 60% after EU 
Eastern Enlargement. Total EU trade with Russia in 2003 amounted to 85 billion euro and the 
EU had a trade deficit of around -20 billion euro. Russian exports to the EU consist mainly of 
fuel: it provides 15% of the EU’s fuel import needs (EUROPEAN COMISSION 2003). 
Imports from the EU to Russia include a large share of manufactured goods. Some of the 
main imported items are machinery and equipment (20% of the total), food (13%), electric 
and telecom devices (10%), wood and furniture (7%) and cars (6%).  
The EU’s trade relations with the Russian Federation are based on the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA), signed in 1994 and entered into force after national 
ratifications on 1
st December 1997. The agreement regulates the political, economic and 
cultural relations between the EU and Russia and is the legal basis for bilateral trade. One of 
its main objectives is the promotion of trade and investment as well as the development of 
harmonious economic relations between the Parties. The EU-Russia Partnership and Co-
operation Agreement (PCA) extended to the ten new Member States joining the EU on May 
1, 2004. It means that it replaced existing pacts which covered ties of Russia with candidate 
states. As regards economic relations, the PCA includes provisions on (EUROPEAN 
COMISSION 2003):  
•  Most Favoured Nation (MFN). The EU extends to Russia MFN Treatment. 
Therefore, Russia receives the same treatment as if it were already a member of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO). Equally, Russia extends MFN treatment to the 
EU.  
•  There is a special regime for trade in steel and nuclear materials in the PCA.  
•  Freedom of establishment. The PCA facilitates the establishment of production and 
services businesses in certain specified sectors in Russia and in the EU. The EU’s and 
Russian companies are free to establish at least on a national most favoured nation 
basis, i.e. no worse than the conditions applied to any third country. Once established, 
the EU and Russian companies are free to operate on a national treatment basis, i.e. as 
if they were national companies.  
•  Approximation of legislation. Russia has committed itself to approximate its 
legislation with that of the Community. Some of the areas where it intends to align its 
laws with the EU's are standards and certification, competition law, company law, 
banking law, company accounts and taxes, financial services, rules of public 
procurement, customs law.  
•  There are further provisions on Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and trade defence 
instruments. 15 
•  Implementation of the PCA, is being carried out by means of meetings of the 
institutions created by the agreement: EU/Russia Summit, Cooperation Council 
(ministerial level), Cooperation Committee (senior official level), Sub-Committees on 
technical issues. 
As provided by the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU Council adopted in June 1999 a 
Common Strategy on Russia, with the aim to strengthen the strategic partnership between 
Russia and the EU, giving it a horizon extending far into the next century. On its side, Russia 
also adopted a strategy towards the EU proving the mutual interest of both the EU and Russia 
in a special relationship. The EU's Common Strategy on Russia combines Member States' and 
European Community policies and actions in the priority areas of: consolidation of 
democracy, rule of law and public institutions; integration of Russia into a common European 
economic and social space; stability and security in Europe and beyond; common challenges 
on the European continent (environment, crime). The PCA, TACIS and Member States' 
assistance programmes are the main instruments for implementing the Common Strategy. 
The EU is the most important assistance donor to Russia. Between 1991 and 2003, Russia 
received 2.6 billion euro in aid from the EU. The bulk of the aid is allocated via the extensive 
TACIS programme (Technical Assistance to CIS Countries). This programme was initiated 
in 1991 with a view to contributing technical and economic assistance to the 12 CIS countries 
during the adjustment process (GOWAN 2000). The primary objective is to support the 
process of economic and democratic reform, including the promotion of independent media 
and non-governmental organisations, banking and tax sector reforms as well as social 
reforms. In recent years, the TACIS programme has developed into a valuable tool for 
underpinning the political goals formulated in the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement 
and the EU Common Strategy on Russia. The TACIS Indicative Programme for Russia for 
the period 2004-06 includes a special package for Kaliningrad, cost at some 25 million euro 
over these three years and focusing in particular on sectors such as administrative reform and 
business development, public health, education, and cross-border cooperation. 
The EU economic co-operation and political dialogue with Russia take place in many 
fora. The Summits are the most important, and are held twice a year. Similarly, Russian and 
the EU Foreign Ministers meet at least once a year in the Co-operation Council. Regular 
meetings take place between the Russian Foreign Minister and the EU troika (EU Presidency, 
the incoming EU Presidency, the Commission and the Council Secretary-General) and also 
between a number of expert groups at officials level. Current issues are discussed also in the 
Parliamentary Co-operation Committee, which includes Members of the European Parliament 
and the Russian Parliament. At the 14th Summit between the European Union and Russia, 
held in The Hague on 25 November 2004 the European Commission represented the High 
Representative for the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, and the 
President of the European Commission, Jose Manuel Durao Barroso. The Russian delegation 
was led by the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin. The leaders of the EU and 
Russia particularly welcomed that the Kyoto protocol will enter into force in February 2005, 
following ratification by Russia, and noted that this will provide a solid basis for strengthened 
bilateral and international cooperation on climate change. This was the second Summit after 
the EU historic enlargement. Therefore, the extension of the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement to the new EU Member States was welcomed. The leaders of the Summit 
reviewed the steps taken to address the impact of EU Eastern Enlargement on EU/Russia 
relations and stressed their firm commitment to actively continue this work to fulfil the "Joint 
Statement on EU Enlargement and EU-Russia Relations" of 27 April 2004.  
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Following  the success of the previous summit and the progress achieved in creation of the 
four ’common spaces’ (economic; freedom, security and justice; research, education and 
culture; and external security), the leaders welcomed the efforts made to put in place the 
conditions for increased and intensified trade and investment between the EU and Russia. 
They took note of a progress report on the energy dialogue as well as of the results of the EU-
Russia Industrialists Round Table, which took place on 10 November 2004 in The Hague. 
(THE EC DELEGATION IN RUSSIA, 2004) 
What is written above only confirm that the European Union and the Russian Federation 
have undoubtedly an important trade relationship. The interest of both parties in maintaining 
and strengthening cooperation and making trade relations more predictable, transparent and 





4.  Trade Consequences of the EU Eastern Enlargement to Russia 
4.1  EU Enlargement – an Opportunity for CEE Countries 
Under the Copenhagen criteria, membership requires that the candidate country ensures: 
•  “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
the respect for and protection of minorities”- the political criteria 
•  “the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union” – the economic criteria. 
•  “ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of 
political, economic and monetary union” – acquis communautaire.  
The economic criteria consist of two elements: 
•  the existence of a functioning market economy - it requires macroeconomic stability 
and that prices, as well trade, are liberalized and that an enforceable legal system, 
including property rights, is in place; a well-developed financial sector, the absence of 
any significant barriers to market entry and exit improve the efficiency of the 
economy; it also requires a sufficient amount of human and physical capital. 
•  the capacity to withstand competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. 
Beyond the EU membership criteria, there are the Maastricht criteria, which are even 
stronger because they define the macroeconomic convergence which is needed for entering 
the single currency area of the euro. 
Those candidates who fulfilled these requirements become EU members. 
The historical and political arguments in favour of the EU Eastern Enlargement are 
compelling. It should produce substantial economic benefits. As of the day of accession, the 
new member states apply the EU's Common Commercial Policy in its entirety, including the 
Common External Tariff, EU preferential trade agreements, WTO commitments and EU trade 
defence measures. They also adopt internal market rules and benefit from the four freedoms 
set out in the Treaty. Full integration with accession, together with the adoption of common 17 
rules and standards across the world’s largest single market, will further enhance the 
opportunities to achieve socially and environmentally sustainable growth.  
The static theory of customs unions ignores the many dynamic effects of customs unions 
and other forms of economic integration on economic growth. An economic integration can 
promote economic welfare not only by inducing higher efficiency but also by stimulating 
growth. Indeed, the impact of its dynamic effects on world welfare may well overwhelm any 
negative static effects. The most obvious consequences is market extension – of producers 
and consumers. 
A key academic study by the Centre for Economic Policy Research estimated already in 
1997 that trade and investment, both within the enlarged Union and with EU’s external 
partners, will greatly benefit from an extra 105 million consumers and a 34% increase in area 
as the result of the fifth Enlargement. In fact, the new member- countries became part of the 
EU Single Market, that is the largest in the world with a population of almost 455 Million 
people, GDP of around 9231 billion euro, 19% of world trade, 46% of world outward FDI and 
24% of inward FDI and with a high degree of openness. Free movement of goods, services, 
labour and capital with internal barriers being removed (border controls, certification, etc.) 
and a common border protection. What means that some new members’ links with their 
neighbours in the former Soviet Union should enable EU-based firms to engage in increased 
trade and investment in the new Member States. Developing countries, enjoying preferential 
access to the EU, should find new markets in the acceding countries and new members may 
also improve their access to the markets of developing countries through economic and trade 
co-operation.  
What will accession of the CEE countries mean for Russia which, in fact, was the second 




4.2  EU Enlargement and Russia 
 “Russia is best placed to benefit from EU Enlargement” Ms Francoise Le Bail, Director for 
Russia, DG Trade (THE EC DELEGATION IN RUSSIA 2003). Based on the EC’s analyses, 
the EU Enlargement should be also beneficial for EU-Russia relations and Russia’s trade 
in the long run, mostly through (EUROPEAN COMISSION 2002): 
•  the advantages of having a zone of peace, stability and prosperity as a neighbour 
•  introduction of EU tariffs in the CEE countries, because the EU tariffs are much 
lower than those which were in force in the CEE countries (for example Poland, 
which used to have the highest tariffs amongst the acceding countries, had to reduce 
her tariffs for imported Russian manufacturing goods from 15.8% to 4.1%). 
•  for trade in goods the new member states had to adopt the Community Common 
Customs Tariff (CCT) upon accession. The average weighted industrial tariffs of the 
acceding countries were in general higher than the 3.6% average for the EU; the same 
applies to agricultural tariffs. Thus, in most cases, third countries' business should 
benefit from lower tariffs in their trade with new member states. 
•  extension of the common Community trade regime and single market rules.  Indeed, 
not only a single tariff, but also a single set of trade rules and a single set of 
administrative procedures applied across the Single Market of the enlarged Union.   
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The current system, featuring a single trade regime for the EU and a different regime 
for each of the candidates, disappeared. A single set of trade rules, a single tariff, and 
a single set of administrative procedures applied not just across the existing fifteen 
member states but across the enlarged Union of twenty-five. This should greatly 
simplifies dealings for third-country operators within Europe, thus facilitating 
investment and trade.  
•  the releasing of financial problems- better credit possibilities, export credit 
insurance system in the CEE countries that will get inside the EU-might have a 
positive effect on trade relation between Russia and East-Europe. 
Recent macro-economic studies by CEPS (Centre for European Policy Studies) and the 
RECEP (Russian European Centre for Economic Policy) have concluded that the effects of 
the EU Enlargement will be positive for the Russian economy. They estimate that Russian 
welfare will increase as a result of the Enlargement by around 2%, with Russia’s GDP, 
exports and its terms of trade also should improve. The study by CEPS estimates in particular 
that Russian exports to the enlarged EU will go up by around 4% to the current EU-15, and by 
more than 1% to the ten new Member States. 
Though Russia would gain certain advantages by the expansion, these advantages might 
be less as compared to the disadvantages deriving from her outside position. The point from 
Russian side is not simply the fact that expansion was going without her participation, but the 
situation according to which Russia is staying outdoor of EU, whereas new members take full 
advantages of market liberalization.  As the result the EU market opening for new members 
should strengthen competitiveness of products of the EU new member states on the EU 
market (Appendix 1). There are such worries as: application of new non-tariff barriers to 
trade, trade diversion because of an increased productivity gap with the CEE countries, 
diversion of investment from Russia to the new EU members, infrastructure problems, 
deterioration of conditions for the transit of goods, including the problem of transit between 
Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia. Considering these effects, it may create the most serious 
consequences for Russian economic interest, therefore, I would like to introduce them closer 
and give the EU view on al these Russia’s concerns. 
 
4.2.1  Relations with CEE Countries  
Russian experts assume a likely deterioration in trade and the economic regime for Russia in 
its relations with the CEE countries after their accession to the EU. This can be due to the 
fact, that in the past few years the group of East-Europe countries, which joined EU during 
the Eastern Enlargement, had accounting for the biggest share in the turnover of Russia (22% 
of Russia’s export and 8% of imports).  
Russia had feared losing trade benefits with the new EU member states, mostly former 
Soviet satellites, by adopting by them EU tariffs and standards. However, this case will be 
presented further, here I would like to focus on other issue – second site of coin.  
These countries are not only the biggest markets for Russia products in the region, but the 
rate of growth in the trade with these countries exceed that of total Russian foreign trade and 
trade with East Europe itself regarding both exports and imports. As according to the theory 
of trade creation, the market access of goods will be presumably improving for the East 
European producers after joining to the EU, it may causes even worsening market access for 
Russian sellers on the enlarged EU-market. Going into the detail, the biggest competitors for 
Russia companies in the EU market may come from among these countries as a result of 
formulating within EU the trade area (theory of trade diversion). From among the main EU 19 
import products or product group, in which Russian sales are significant, Czech, Polish and 
Latvian sellers are the biggest rivals to Russian’s in the case of wood products. On the market 
of iron and steel products Czech, Poland, Slovakia and Romania can be found among her 
biggest rivals. Hungary’s joining seems to be the most indifferent for Russia from purely 
economic point view. Hungary represents a relatively small market, moreover,  Hungarian 
and Russian sellers on the EU-markets are in most cases not rivals to each other having in 
mind the most important import products of the EU. The participation of Slovenia and Estonia 
will create probably even less impacts on Russian economic interests due to their small size 
and marginal role played in Russian foreign trade turnover. 
The signing of free trade area agreements with the CEE countries - or some of them- 
would be the way of releasing Russia’s problems in this case. However, the main obstacle to 
this is, that the associated CEE countries consider all of their foreign trade policy decisions in 
the light of their EU-joining. Due to this they are not willing to sign free trade or other special 
agreements with those countries that have no similar agreement with the EU itself  
As for Russian investment opportunities they will probably be adversely affected by the 
EU Enlargement since it will certainly increase the already existing competitive edge of the 
CEE countries on the world and European financial markets. The EU, however assumes that it 
is still unclear whether accession to the EU will result also in a considerable diversion of the 
CEE countries trade from Russia to Western Europe and vice versa. Logically, trade 
diversion should be insignificant because the commercial ties between the two sides had 
collapsed much earlier and the existing level of trade is too low to diminish any further. 
Already during the period of the gradual implementation of the Europe-agreements 
Russian products had to face more and more disadvantageous situation on the EU-markets. 
Paying attention to the recent priorities of Russian foreign trade policy such as stimulating the 
production of manufacturing goods, the deterioration of trade conditions for Russia sales is of 
vital significance. It is so even if the major part of Russian exports to both the EU and CEE 
countries consists of raw materials, especially energy carriers- both on the EU-markets, but in 
a bigger extent on the CEE countries markets. This is the argument of the EU, when it says 
that the creation of a free trade area between the EU and the associated members should not 
have any considerable effect on Russian interests, since raw materials and low-processed 
products are subjected to minimum customs taxation if any. 
 
4.2.2  Tariffs and Non-Tariffs Barriers 
After the EU Enlargement, 51 per cent of Russia's trade is with the EU. Therefore, one of the 
possible concerns is the effect of the Community tariffs being adopted by the candidate 
countries. Russia had complained that the introduction of common EU trade tariffs in the 
new member states would cost it 300 million USD a year. However, the overall level of tariff 
protection in the EU decreased after Enlargement. The current average tariff in the EU is 








   ACs EU 
Steel 
products 
Poland: 10.3%  1.7% 
Cars and 
trucks 
Czech Rep  7.1%  4.6% 
Meat 
products    
Hungary:    28.8%  21.8% 
Source: European Commission, DG Trade (2003) 
 
So as Polish, Czech, Hungarian tariffs came down, Russia should  benefit also in 
agriculture, for the following reasons: 
•  safeguard measures or quotas applied by acceding countries on agricultural products 
are lifted (e.g. Czech Republic on sugar,  Poland on goose eggs, etc.). The EU does 
not apply any safeguard measures on agriculture products. 
•  certain products that were being exported to Russia from acceding countries with 
export support in these countries no longer benefit from this support under the EU 
system (e.g. pork meat from Poland). 
The truth is also that some tariffs went up, but the benefits in terms of overall tariff 
protection in the ten new Member States after the EU Enlargement should outweigh any 
negative effects in specific products for Russia.  
At closer analysis it appears to be quite favourable - the Common External Tariff of the 
EU, which applied by acceding countries, as was said above, is on average lower than 
national tariffs previously applied. Moreover, there is also such possibility that Russia and the 
EU may sign an agreement on the EU Enlargement according to which, Russia will receive 
compensation if, due to the enlargement, the duty on specific goods increases. The 
compensation will be provided according to the rules of the World Trade Organization. 
More complicated may seem to be the implementation of non-tariff barriers (especially 
quantitative restrictions). Russia was afraid that some new EU members, having introduced 
the common EU restrictions, might in addition retain their existing national practices of 
market protection. However, acceding countries had to apply the common trade regime 
without exceptions. If they did not, it is obvious that the single market could not function. The 
EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that was also adopted by acceding 
countries, ended the use of quantitative restrictions between the EU and Russia. However, 
there are still some sectors where the European Union maintains some limited quantitative 
restrictions with third countries, notably in the cases of textiles and steel. Indeed the new 
member states had to apply these restrictions as of their accession, but the effect on third 
countries will be limited. The WTO rules foresee that all textiles and clothing quotas shall be 
phased out by 31 December 2004. As far as steel is concerned, the two EC agreements which 
foresee quotas run until 31 December 2004 and would disappear if the countries concerned 
joined the WTO before then. Moreover, what is important, upon accession to the EU, new 
Member had to remove all quantitative restrictions currently applied, i.e. Hungary on textile 
products, Poland on coal. 
Next point of concerns: Russia is afraid that its exports of energy products to the 
enlarged EU will decrease as a result of the application by acceding countries of the EU’s 
trade regime for energy products. Francoise Le Bail, Director for Russia, DG Trade stated that 
this will not be the case. First, the EU's tariffs for energy products are lower than those of 
certain new Member States. Furthermore, the EU has never applied any tariffs on imports of 21 
fuel, gas or electricity. Secondly, on trade in nuclear materials, at the most recent Summits, 
EU and Russia have agreed to reach a mutually acceptable solution, again in the context of 
the EU Eastern Enlargement and the need to ensure reliable, secure and safe supplies for the 
enlarged EU. Thirdly, the EU has recently agreed to deregulate and liberalise its energy 
market for gas by 2007, which will create new opportunities for Russian exporters. Therefore, 
Russia is and will continue to be a major supplier of energy products to the enlarged EU.The 
EU has the Trade Barriers Regulation (TBR), the Community’s offensive commercial 
policy instrument, which gives industry the opportunity to lodge a complaint with the 
Commission when there is reason to believe that companies are encountering trade barriers 
that restrict their access to third country markets. The EU has also two main Trade Defence 
Instruments (TDI) at its disposal to ensure fair trade: anti-dumping  and  anti-subsidy 
measures. Russian exporters may, therefore, encounter supplementary difficulties as a result 
of EU competition policy being adopted by the candidate countries. Particularly sensitive may 
be the extension of the standing anti-dumping procedures, or of the unilateral obligations 
taken by Russian firms with regard to existing EU markets. Therefore, by the moment 
antidumping procedures affecting Russian exports seems to be the most awkward question 
between the Russia and the EU. As of 31 December 2001, the Community had 11 definitive 
and no provisional anti-dumping measures in force against Russia. Undertakings had been 
accepted in 5 out of these 11 cases. The value of imports covered by measures in 2001 was  
167 million euro, representing 1.3% of total imports from Russia. The value of anti-dumping 
duties declared on Russian products in 2001 was under 20 million euro, meaning that the 
average duty imposed was in the region of 12%. As of 30 September 2002, the Community 
had anti-dumping measures on imports of 12 products from Russia (5 of which are covered by 
undertakings). The value of imports covered by measures during the first half of 2002 was 93 
million euro (1.5% of imports). However, the amount of anti-dumping duties declared was  
3.4 million euro, i.e. an average duty of less than 4% (EUROPEAN COMISSION 2004). The 
EC argues that the new anti-dumping (AD) rules adopted by acceding countries absolutely 
will not create further barriers for the access of Russian exports to the European market. The 
EU legislation and procedure are in line with applicable WTO and other international 
agreements on unfair trading practices and the purpose of AD rules is not to create barriers to 
trade, but rather to provide a fair, level playing field by fighting unfair trade practices. 
Therefore, the EU will continue to make use of trade defence instruments as it has until now, 
that is with prudence and moderation, as well as in full accordance with WTO legislation. 
However, as clearly recognized by Russia, the Russian energy market has not yet been 
liberalized (although this is the goal).  This implies that energy prices in Russia are still 
subject to state regulation of prices and are not subject to market forces and thus out of line 
with the true full costs of energy (i.e. with natural advantages). This is further underlined by 
the existence of dual pricing. In these circumstances WTO rules allow adjustments to be made 
to energy prices in the calculation of dumping margins.  
By definition, market economies are automatically subject to anti-subsidy rules, as defined 
by the WTO. General WTO principles are also in EU law. It is EU policy to apply WTO-plus 
rules to all third countries, regardless of whether they are WTO members or not. Moreover, 
“there appears to be a misunderstanding of basic concepts on the part of certain Russian 
exporters, because the AD instrument is not aimed at natural or competitive advantages. 
Prices which are “cheap” because they do not reflect true costs (for example because prices 
are set by the State) can be adjusted. This is logical and has nothing to do with true 
advantages”  
The WTO rules on compensation do not concern the application of anti-dumping 
measures since such measures can be imposed notwithstanding the provisions concerning  
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bound duty rates. Nonetheless, as was done for the last the EU Enlargement, the Commission 
may in specific cases carry out reviews on request to examine if the anti-dumping measures 
would have been significantly different if they were based on information including new 
Member States. So like for the last enlargement, the EU will be prepared to receive requests 
from exporters if they can show that circumstances with regard to a case have changed 
substantially due to enlargement. And again, the new Member States ceased to apply any 
measures were in force against Russian imports i.e. Polish measures on calcium carbide, for 
Lithuanian measures on quicklime and portland cement, for Czech measures on welded tubes 
and pipes, etc, and for measures by several new member countries on Russian ammonium 
nitrate. Thus, Russian exports of some of these particular products are likely to increase after 
Enlargement. 
As to other trade defence measures – export subsidies, the new Member States also 
automatically applied the EU acquis in this field, including whatever measures are in force at 
that moment. However, the EU is continuing to reduce, substantially, use of export subsidies 
by 45% in value.  
 
4.2.3  The EU’s Standards 
Another point of concerns is that Russian exports of manufactured goods may be put under 
pressure by the shift from national standards and certification procedures in the CEE 
countries, which were generally of COMECON origin, to those of the EU. Needless to say 
that the new standards, particularly in those areas where certification is mandatory, will be 
rather difficult to master in view of the notoriously low competitiveness of Russian industry. 
However, the application of certification rules and the extension of the same standards, such 
as  phytosanitary procedures, environmental protection  standards, etc., for all new 
Member States should simplify the activity of Russian operators in the single market as they 
will have to comply with just one set of rules.  
 
4.2.4  Other Economic Issues 
It is rather difficult to predict the effects of the imminent change-over to the euro in Central 
and Eastern Europe. Trade, where the currency is nothing more than a neutral vehicle, is 
likely to follow its own course and the introduction of the euro will hardly create any specific 
problems. The US dollar will certainly retain its position unless there is a major shift in the 
international energy and raw materials markets. More consequential may be the eventual 
conversion of Russian long-term assets and liabilities in the CEE countries. However, the 
material effects of such a conversion are not to be exaggerated. Most of  experts argue also, 
that in any case the process will be market-driven rather than government-negotiated, and 
there is very little that could be done by either side.  
The accession of countries of Central and Eastern Europe to the EU may improve the 
conditions of Russian commodity transit to Western Europe, which is not infrequently 
subject to arbitrary actions of the candidate countries. Nonetheless this issue, which is of 
paramount importance for both Russia and its European partners, will have to be carefully 
regularized in conformity with the new conditions. One of the major problems is safeguarding 
an unhampered movement of goods between the Kaliningrad enclave and the rest of Russia. 
In the course of the debate many questions were raised about the situation in the Oblast and 
how it affects neighbouring countries, the real interests and intentions of the parties involved 
in the debate, and the future of the region.  
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4.2.5  Kaliningrad and EU Enlargement: a Border or a Barrier? 
The focal point of all long-term complications brought about by the EU Enlargement is the 
fate of the Kaliningrad enclave. Kaliningrad is a unique part of Russia, separated 
geographically from the rest of the country and surrounded by the EU.  
In the EU’s opinion Russia’s regions should benefit substantially from the Enlargement, 
especially Kaliningrad, which is well placed to take advantages of the new opportunities that 
will be created. As was already mentioned in the paper, Russian goods should benefit from 
significantly lower tariffs after the Enlargement and these lower tariff levels applied to goods 
originating in Kaliningrad on the same basis as the rest of Russia. Given its proximity to the 
EU markets this prospect of easier access represents an important opportunity for 
Kaliningrad. Since Kaliningrad relies strongly on trade with neighbouring areas, it should 
have an interest in adopting EU technical norms and standards to enable it to take full benefit 
from this improved market access. However, until a more detailed assessment is done, it 
cannot be excluded that the changes in the trade regime which will take place on accession 
might have an impact on particular products (CENTRE FOR EASTERN STUDIES 2001). 
Responsibility for Kaliningrad lies with Russia and the region itself. However, the EU and 
its Member States have an interest in helping to ensure that the changes required by accession 
are made smoothly and in fostering co-operation with Kaliningrad on a number of regional 
issues. There are several documents approved by the relevant institutions of the EU and 
Russia. The first document on Russia’s concerns inspired by the Eastern Enlargement of the 
European Union was submitted to the Commission in August 1999. A dialogue started more 
than a year later, in October 2000. From EU’s side, there is a communication by the European 
Commission to the Council entitled “The EU and Kaliningrad”. From Russia’s side, there 
are so far three Russian documents. One of them is a decision by the Russian government on 
“Measures for ensuring social and economic development and vitality of Kaliningrad oblast “. 
Two other documents – “Possible solutions to the specific problems of Kaliningrad region in 
connection with the EU Enlargement” drafted by the Russian Ministry for Trade and 
Economic Development, and the “In-depth evaluation” of the Commission’s communication 
(BORKO 2002).  
It was recently announced that most of Russia's trade concerns related to the EU 
Enlargement had been resolved, although the arrangements for goods transit between Russia 
and its Kaliningrad "exclave" were still at issue, and a Joint Statement linked to the PCA 
extension was still to be agreed. 
Issues arising from the enlargement process, which appear on Russian side, are namely: 
the movement of goods and people between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia, including visa 
regime, energy supply of the region, trans-border cooperation and fisheries. One aspect of 
movement of goods that requires attention is border crossings. However, experience of the 
last enlargement has demonstrated that the introduction of the acquis on the border between 
Finland and Russia can speed up border crossing formalities. It should be possible to build on 
this positive experience and to use some of the funds available through the PHARE and 
TACIS programmes to finance improvements in border crossing facilities and procedures, in 
close co-operation with the Russian authorities.  
The introduction of the acquis by new Member States have an impact on third countries in 
terms of visa requirements and border controls. Travel, for whatever purpose, to or through 
EU Member States requires possession of a visa. Therefore, another problem, which is clearly 
underestimated, is the impact of EU Enlargement on the free movement of persons. The 
introduction of visas and more rigorous border controls between Russia and the CEE 
countries became a problem for thousands of people who have become accustomed to  
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unrestricted movement in the area, visiting their relatives and friends, shopping, performing 
miscellaneous little jobs or carrying out various business activities. This is perhaps the 
greatest net loss which will be inflicted by the EU Enlargement on the citizens of Russia and 
the CEE countries (CENTRE FOR EASTERN STUDIES 2002). 
As far as concrete decisions are concerned, they depend on the character of the issues to 
be under consideration. They are seen as special agreements between Russia and the EU (for 
example, on fisheries or the special visa regime for residents of Kaliningrad), joint decisions 
(Indicative TACIS programs), or unilateral decisions (participation of European Investment 
Bank or Regulation for Kaliningrad SEZ), etc. In particular, if at present EU-Russia trade 
relations are governed by the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) signed in 1994 
and upon accession Poland and Lithuania took over the PCA as part of the acquis and the 
common external tariff applied in trade between Russia and the enlarged EU, Russia is 
interested in concluding the agreements on the Kaliningrad issues also with the participation 
of the authorities of Poland, Lithuania and Latvia within their national competence 
(EUROPEAN COMISSION 2002).  
In February 2003 in Vilnius a Financing Memorandum, was signed by Minister of 
Finance Dalia Grybauskaite and Head of the European Commission Delegation Michael 
Graham, providing Lithuania 12 million euro financial support for implementing the new 
system of facilitated transit procedures of Russian citizens through Lithuania to and 
from Kaliningrad Region. The project, financed in 100% by the Community, aims to 
guarantee proper control of transit of passengers between Kaliningrad and other parts of 
Russia through the introduction of a Facilitated Rail Transit Documents/Facilitated Transit 
Documents scheme. Moreover, worth mentioning is also fact that Russia, the EU as well as 
new members involved in this issue started talks with the aim of signing an agreement on 
Kaliningrad cargo transit started and talks on easing visa regulations. 
The potentials of the “Northern Dimension” programme and some other frames of 
regional cooperation have also to be taken into consideration. Lately, the Council has adopted 
the  Second Northern Dimension Action Plan for the period 2004-2006. The present 
document follows the First Action Plan for the Northern Dimension, adopted by the European 
Council in Feira in June 2000, and expiring at the end of 2003. Plan covers five broad priority 
sectors 
All above mentioned issues connected with the influence of EU Enlargement on 
Kaliningrad are being assessed by experts in Russia, the CEE countries and the European 
Union, however, there are different opinions among them. Some of them assume that if the 
Kaliningrad region retains strong links with Russia, its presence in the midst of integrating 
EU territories may be an irritating nuisance for the Europeans, particularly if organized crime 
and corruption remain systemic features of the Russian situation.  
The official view, that it is bound to become a major hub of EU-Russian cooperation, is 
superficial. From time to time, proposals have been made also for special trade regime for 
Kaliningrad. Nevertheless, since Kaliningrad is an integral part of Russia, it might be difficult 
to grant any special status, such as free trade or a customs union. It is not clear that any 
special treatment is needed (WSPÓLNOTY EUROPEJSKIE 2001).  
From a political point of view, the process of the EU Eastern Enlargement was welcomed 
by Russia, since it was understood that Russia would have a reliable neighbour on the 
continent to the west of its borders. However this favourable political climate should be a 
basis now to new measurement which have to be undertaken to develop closer trade 
cooperation between Russia and the EU as well as new member states from CEE in order to 
keep these important export markets for Russia. It is also expected that all the negative effects 25 
of the Eastern Enlargement of the EU may be reduced by Russia’s joining to the WTO. On 
the other side Russia will have to make her sacrifice for the membership by further opening 
up, especially-liberalisation in foreign trade regulation. For Russia it will be definitely 
difficult situation and dilemma: how to continue successfully the process of opening up when 
there is such obstacle as the EU Enlargement, which may reduce exports, especially in the 
manufacturing sector and deteriorate Russia’s economy? The issue is now part of Russia’s 




5.  Strengthening the need for building the CEES between the EU 
and Russia 
There are fundamental factors, described already in this paper that must be taken into account 
when making common economic and trade policy choices for Russia. 
•  One of them is that Russia’ economy is faced with the challenge of producing 
sustained, high rates and economic growth. 
•  A second factor is that Russia has a relatively narrow industrial manufacturing base 
and economic policy need to be directed toward facilitating the emerge of small and 
medium-sized industries in the manufacturing and services sector. 
•  A third factor is that the key to durable recovery of the Russian economy lies in 
opening up for trade, in a return of investors and adoption of reforms. 
•  A fourth factor is connected with EU-Russia economic relationship and EU trade 
regime. Because the EU uses the protection regime for the domestic goods and the 
export some of technically complicated manufactured articles from Russia to the EU, 
Russia expects the EU to further liberalize access to its markets for goods and 
services, on the basis of predictable, transparent, and non-discriminatory rules. The 
EU point out that is already opening its markets further to developing countries, and 
is supporting comprehensive efforts to ensure that developing countries enjoy the 
benefits of multilateral liberalization. However, the EU states also that opening 
markets – and keeping them open without discrimination must be supported by the 
application of common rules and a general acceptance that certain types of behaviour 
are unfair.  
Such efforts proceed also in coordination with related initiatives within institutions 
including the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). For example, the aim of the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers 
to Trade (TBT Agreement) is to ensure that mandatory technical regulations, voluntary 
standards, and procedures for assessing conformity with technical regulations and standards 
that do not create unnecessary obstacles to international trade. It is a useful tool in tackling 
unnecessary technical barriers to trade. The EU has made the promotion of international 
standards what helps to reduce unnecessary differences among national conformity 
assessment procedures. The EU would also like to promote the international harmonization of 
conformity assessment procedures wherever appropriate. This would help eliminate 
duplication of efforts and simplify procedures. The EU launched a new market access 
strategy in February 1996. This initiative gave EU trade policy a more proactive stance, in  
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tune with the real needs of European exporters in an increasingly interdependent global 
economy. Thanks to the market access strategy the Commission has solved more than 150 
cases of obstacles to trade in third country markets. It has performed particularly well against 
high tariffs, technical barriers to trade and burdensome customs procedures. It has focused 
primarily on barriers with a cross-sectoral effects on trade. But there were also good results in 
agriculture, automobiles, ferrous and non-ferrous metals, telecoms, textiles and financial 
services. These results are spread across a wide spectrum of countries which have agreed to 
dismantle trade barriers after consultations with the EC. The market access strategy has 
introduced new procedures to strengthen co-ordination between those involved in trade policy 
in the European Commission, Member States and European businesses. Thus, the strategy has 
improved the flow of information on specific barriers. It, therefore, contributes to the 
identification and elimination of barriers. The Commission has now established a standard 
procedure to identify priority barriers with a view to removing them by: 
•  making use of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism; 
•  improving implementation by trading partners of their obligations under bilateral 
agreements with the EU, including where appropriate, use of the dispute settlements 
mechanism; 
•  addressing market access problems during the negotiation of new bilateral agreements 
(e.g. the free trade areas) 
•  organizing bilateral consultations targeting major non-WTO issues with key trading 
partners; 
•  carrying out bilateral consultations on market access issues with a view to 
implementing mutually beneficial market access packages; 
•  The final factor relates also to EU Eastern Enlargement, its effect on Russia’s 
trade and the following questions: is there any chance that Russia, being a European 
country, may one day join the European Union as a fully-fledged member, provided it 
fulfils the Copenhagen criteria? Or, on the contrary, because of its size, geopolitical 
position, historical and cultural heritage, multi-ethnicity and a host of other reasons, 
Russia will never become a member of the European Union? These questions are by 
no means rhetorical. If Russia is to join the European Union sooner or later it has no 
other option but to follow the path taken by the CEE countries. However, because in 
the meantime, there is no reasonable prospect of Russia's accession to the EU, 
Moscow has to look for a strategy that will help her to be at an advantage position 
after the Enlargement. It would be also desirable that the EU – and the new member 
countries –not only support the Russian opening-up and integration into the world 
economy but also actively search for the solutions satisfactory for all parties. 
The EU started its internal reflection on the impact of the EU Enlargement on its close 
neighbours including Russia a long time ago. As shown by the Wider Europe 
communication released by the Commission on 11 March 2003. The European 
Commission presented the following communication to the European Council and Parliament: 
"Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and 
Southern Neighbours". The "Wider Europe" concept is directed at two regions: the Southern 
Mediterranean countries, which include Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Palestine, Syria and Tunisia, as well as former USSR countries Belarus, Moldova, 
Russia and Ukraine. The lack of membership perspectives as regards the first group has long 
since been clearly outlined, however, the EU declarations with regard to the second have, 
hitherto, not been univocal. Including these four countries in the "Wider Europe" initiative 27 
clearly shows that the Union does not, at present, see membership perspectives for them 
(although, as indicated in the communication, the appearance of such perspectives in the 
future cannot be entirely excluded). It is, therefore, clear that Brussels - even though it does 
not yet see membership perspectives for a series of present and future neighbours - is 
interested in tightening co-operation with these countries. However, success within this scope 
requires the elaboration of a new, uniform concept of a policy directed at countries of 
geographic proximity with which, at this stage, the EU wishes to build relations without 
referring to the possibility of their entering the European Union. A model for co-operation, 
which would create equal opportunities and possibilities of co-operation for all those 
neighbours of the Union, who do not currently have membership perspectives (CENTRE 
FOR EASTERN STUDIES 2003). 
Russia should also anticipate that the specific policy priorities  of new member-
countries will influence the EU’s general policies. Consider, as one example of this, the EU 
Northern Dimension policy, which was created under the influence of Member States such as 
Finland and Sweden.  According to statements of lately adopted Second Northern Dimension 
Plan - a favourable business climate must be developed on both sides of the future EU-border 
through, inter alia, the implementation of economic reforms in the Russia Federation, and 
Russian efforts to integrate with the international economy (through WTO accession), and 
with the EU economy (through the Common European Economic Space initiative). Further 
efforts will be made to remove technical and other barriers to trade and investment, support 
economic reforms, promote Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). 
All above mentioned four elements suggest that some important strategic changes will be 
made in Russia and the EU-Russia relations. The first concerns Russian accession to the 
World Trade Organisation. The second, which relates to EU-RF trade relations and the EU 
Enlargement, is based on the creation of a Common European Economic Space (CEES) 
between the EU and Russia.  
The building of a CEES will embrace Russia and 25 countries of EU. The Eastern 
Enlargement of the EU expanded the common borders and common interests of Russia and 
the EU and thus gave a new impetus for closer co-operation. The EU is Russia’s most 
important trading partner and even more important after EU Enlargement. The EU and Russia 
agree that the CEES is more than a useful solution for Russia and its trade policy-it is a 
necessary solution, since the enlarged Union may represent almost 60% of Russian export. 
Greater integration may bring greater interdependence between the economies and societies of 
the EU and Russia. The CEES reflects this new situation and may serve as important tool to 
facilitate further efforts to bring the EU and Russia closer together.  
What could the Common European Economic Space be? Where should be located in the 
scale of all possible forms of integration with the EU? Will it be similar to the European 






5.1  Searching for the Form of CEES 
The CEES concept should be located somewhere in the scale of all the possible forms of 





Are at the bottom of the pyramid. They create a free-trade zone (other terminology: free 
trade area, customs zone, export processing zone (EPZ), industrial free zone etc.) for 
industrial goods (UNITED NATIONS 1990). Building its own free-trade areas - it is a good 
way for third non- member country, as most of CEE countries did a long time ago, to offset 
any adversely affects of the completion of the EU single market. 
Definitions as to what constitutes an export-processing zone are at least as numerous as 
the names used to describe this phenomenon. For practical purposes, an EPZ could be defined 
here as a clearly delineated industrial estate which constitutes a free trade enclave in the 
customs and trade regime of a country, and where foreign manufacturing firms producing 
mainly for export benefit from a certain number of fiscal and financial incentives. The modern 
concept of the export processing zone as a territorial enclave in which foreign firms, 
benefiting from special incentives, including exemptions from customs duties and preferential 
treatment with respect to various fiscal and financial regulations and other privileges produce 
industrial goods for export  
There are several considerations which push governments to opt for EPZ regimes 
(UNITED NATIONS 1992):  
•  a desire to increase foreign exchange earnings and promote export. 
Manufacturing-led economic diversification is now well-established in a number of 
developing countries which previously depended on the production and export of one 
or two agricultural or mineral commodities;  
•  as free trade zone is created to encourage economic initiatives in the manufacture 
goods, the performance of services, commercial and other activities necessary for 
diversifying and increasing export. This is a good investment form, a financial and 
economic standpoint. The benefits of such project exceed their anticipated costs by a 
sufficient margin to allow for an acceptable return on the relatively large investments 
which are to be undertaken. This, in many countries, has been largely achieved, with 
multinationals from both industrialized market economy countries and SMEs from 
dynamic Asian economies investing offshore. Joint ventures with local enterprises are 
also fairly widespread; 
•  their modernizing influence on the host country’s economy, the possibility of 
experimenting with policy instruments not commonly used or untested in the rest of 
the economy, and their ability to facilitate the transition from a closed economy to a 
more open economy; 
•  job creation, particularly in depressed regions  
•  there is also the expectation that the production technologies and organizational 
know-how introduced by foreign investors would contribute to the upgrading of 
workers' skills. Finally, there is the conviction that the presence of efficient foreign 
enterprises would have a demonstration effect on indigenous firms and that positive 
technological spillovers would be facilitated by the fostering of linkages between 
foreign and local enterprises and industries. 
Productive, trading and other related economic activities may be carried out in the free 
trade zones, namely:  
•  organizing the manufacture of goods and services on an up-to-date technical and 
technological level, intended for export; 29 
•  loading, unloading and handling of duty free imported good earmarked for export; 
•  storage and safeguarding of duty free imported good earmarked for export 
•  commercial activity, agency and mediation; 
•  banking, crediting and other financial operations, insurance and re-insurance of 
property. 
Such agreements existed between the EU and other main OECD developed countries. 
Countries with large supplies of labour that is relatively low-cost regardless of the levels 
of skills and qualifications, are the best candidates for such industrial relocation. Moreover, 
exports from EPZ host countries generally benefit from schemes such as the United States' 
and European Union's Generalized System of Preferences. With preferential schemes 
therefore, advantageous conditions for gaining access to markets in industrialized countries 
are guaranteed. Moreover, EPZ has a positive impact on transformation process in host 
country, what may confirm Polish example.  
“Special Economic Zones (SEZ)” in Poland were established by the Special Economic 
Zone Act of October 20, 1994. Poland now has seventeen of them. The law confers to a SEZ 
the right to grant investors special tax benefits over a period of 20 years. The purpose of these 
zones was to create employment by attracting new investment to economically depressed 
areas that suffer from high unemployment. In September 1997 the Polish Government 
established nine new Special Economic Zones. Accordance with the Special Economic Zone 
Act, passed by Parliament on October 20, 1994, the zones provide tax relief to foreign and 
domestic investors if certain investment and employment criteria are met. The advantages of 
the Special Economic Zones were only available if the investment in the zone exceeded the 
certain value and/or a certain employment level. These criteria were established by the local 
authorities. As SEZ generated growth of GDP in regions and helped to limit budget expenses 
on payments of unemployment benefits, their role in the transition period of Poland was 
significant (WSPÓLNOTY EUROPEJSKIE 2002).  




Include preferential but not unrestricted commercial access to the EU market, and 
beneficiaries are granted EU technical and financial assistance. One of the example are the 
successive Lomé Conventions. 
The Lomé Convention sets out the principles and objectives of the Union (at the time 
Community) cooperation with African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. Its main 
characteristics are:  
•  the partnership principle; 
•  the contractual nature of the relationship together with its long-term perspective (5 
years for Lomé I, II, and III, and ten for Lomé IV); 
•  the non-reciprocal preferences for most exports form ACP countries to EEC; 
•  equality between partners, respect for sovereignty, mutual interests and 
interdependence;  
•  the right of each state to determine its own policies;   
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•  security of relations based on the achievements of the cooperation system; 
•  the promotion of human rights, democracy and good governance; strengthening of the 
position of women; the protection of the environment; decentralized cooperation; 
diversification of ACP economies; the promotion of the private sector; and increasing 
regional cooperation 
The new partnership agreement between the European Union member states and the 
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states marks five generations of agreements between 
ACP-EC sovereign states. It is the world's largest financial and political framework for North-
South cooperation. This special partnership is characterised by its non-reciprocal trade 
benefits for ACP states including unlimited entry to the EU market for 99 per cent of 
industrial goods and many other products, especially for the Least Developed Countries 
(LDCs) which number 39 in the ACP grouping. In addition, aid packages for each ACP 
country and region are regularly updated.  
A unique feature of the ACP-EC accord is dialogue and joint administration of its content 
by the Community and the ACP. The ACP states are free to table requests that are mutually 
negotiated with the EU.  
 
Association Agreements 
It is a rather high form of integration with the EU. These agreements include wide 
commercial preferences in the trade of goods and services, leading to free trade after a 
transitory period. They plan a process of approximation of laws aiming at ensuring 
implementation of the four fundamental freedoms, although only the free circulation of goods 
is itself an objective of association agreements. Association agreements are sometimes 
asymmetric to the benefit of the EU partner for a limited period. For instance, at the beginning 
of the enforcement of association agreements with CEE countries, the EU granted duty-free 
access to its market in most fields immediately, while CEE countries were allowed to phase 
out their tariffs via annual reductions over five years. Food products are considered separately 
because commercial rules of the Common Agricultural Policy apply. Association agreements 
also include institutional cooperation (political dialogue, cultural cooperation, common 
decision-making institutions, jurisdictional bodies). European agreements concerning Eastern 
European candidates to EU accession are the best-known examples of such agreements, and 
they were followed by the pre-accession process. 
There is European Economic Area  Agreement of 1992 between EEC and EFTA 
which may be used as an example and which experience may be very helpful in creating 
CEES between the EU and Russia. 
On January 17, 1989, Jaques Delors expressed the idea of a global and structured 
agreement of the 12 members of the EEC with the 7 members of EFTA (Austria, Finland, 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden and  Switzerland). This agreement was signed in 
Porto on May 2,1992. It creates a European Eternal Market representing 95% of the economy 
of the 19 parties, 380 million consumers and 40% of world trade.  
The aim of this Agreement of Association was to promote a continuous and balanced 
strengthening of trade and economic relations between the EFTA and the EU with equal 
conditions of competition, and the respect of the same rules, to set-up a "homogenous 
European economic area” (Art 1) binding EFTA countries to the EU.  
There are four dimensions to the EEA of 1992: 31 
•  (1) “Four fundamental freedoms” 
•  (a)  the free movement of goods 
•  customs duties on imports and exports, and any charges having equivalent effect, are 
prohibited between the EU and EFTA.  Without prejudice to the arrangements set out 
in Protocol 5, this shall also apply to customs duties of a fiscal nature; 
•  quantitative restrictions on imports, exports and all measures having equivalent effect 
are also prohibited between the Contracting Parties; 
•  the Contracting Parties shall ensure that any State monopoly of a commercial 
character be adjusted so that no discrimination regarding the conditions under which 
goods are procured and marketed will exist between nationals of EC Member States 
and EFTA States; 
•  The Contracting Parties shall examine any difficulties that might arise in their trade in 
agricultural products and shall endeavor to seek appropriate solutions. The 
Contracting Parties undertake to continue their efforts with a view to achieving 
progressive liberalization of agricultural trade; 
•  in order to facilitate trade between them, the Contracting Parties shall simplify border 
controls and formalities; 
•  re-export towards a third country against which the exporting Contracting Party 
maintains, for the product concerned, quantitative export restrictions, export duties or 
measures or charges having equivalent effect; a serious shortage, or threat thereof, of 
a product essential to the exporting Contracting Party; 
•  anti-dumping measures, countervailing duties and measures against illicit commercial 
practices attributable to third countries shall not be applied in relations between the 
Contracting Parties, unless otherwise specified in this Agreement. 
•  (b)  the free movement of persons 
•  such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on 
nationality between workers of EC Member States and EFTA States as regards 
employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment; 
•  in order to make it easier for persons to take up and pursue activities as workers and 
self-employed persons, the Contracting Parties shall take the necessary measures, 
concerning the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of 
formal qualifications, and the coordination of the provisions laid concerning the 
taking up and pursuit of activities by workers and self-employed persons; 
•  the freedom of establishment of nationals of an EC Member State down by law, 
regulation or administrative action in the Contracting Parties or an EFTA State in the 
territory of any other of these States. 
•  (c) the free movement of services 
•  activities of an industrial character; commercial character; craftsmen; activities of the 
professions. 
•  (d) the free movement of capital 
•  within the framework of the provisions of this Agreement, there shall be no 
restrictions between the Contracting Parties on the movement of capital belonging to  
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persons resident in EU Member States or EFTA States and no discrimination based 
on the nationality or on the place of residence of the parties or on the place where 
such capital is invested; 
•  the EU and EFTA shall exchange views and information concerning the 
implementation of this Agreement and the impact of the integration on economic 
activities and on the conduct of economic and monetary policies. Furthermore, they 
may discuss macro-economic situations, policies and prospects. This exchange of 
views and information shall take place on a non-binding basis. 
•  (2) The setting up of a system ensuring that competition is not distorted and that the 
rules thereon are equally respected;  
•  (3)  Closer cooperation in other fields, such as research and development, the 
environment, education and social policy; 
•  (4) Institutional and jurisdictional structure. 
The EEA membership implies not only establishment of “the common market” but also 
substantial progress towards harmonization of legislation. The EEA membership effectively 
means adoption by the member states of the EU legislation and standards. At the same time, 
the EEA does not envisage establishment of supranational bodies (except for the dispute 
settlement mechanism). Therefore, the European Economic Area, as a concept, is an approach 
to economic integration much stronger and deeper than free-trade area agreement. It can be 
considered as the strongest form of economic integration with the EU short of accession, and 
sometimes as one possible way of accession. The EEA integration is however clearly distant 
from accession. EU membership requires, as I mentioned before, full acceptance of the aquis 
communautaire. The Accession Partnership are not agreements between the EU and the new 
member-countries, but a framework of objectives based on the Copenhagen criteria and the 
acquis and which have been developed after consultation with the countries concerned. 
 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements. 
These agreements were set-up by the EU with most of the countries of Commonwealth 
of Independent States. The content of such agreements is "to promote trade and investment 
and harmonious economic relations between the Parties" and "to create the necessary 
conditions for the future establishment of a free-trade area between the Community and 
Russia covering substantially all trade in goods between them, as well as conditions for 
bringing about freedom of establishment of companies, of cross-border trade in services and 
of capital movements" (Art.1). Moreover "each Party shall provide for freedom of transit 
through its territory of goods originating in the customs territory or destined for the customs 
territory of the other Party" (Art. 12). 
Because the PCA was described closer earlier in this paper, just to remember that the 
philosophy of such an agreement is to create the conditions for a free-trade area, with the 
further prospect of developing free movement of services and capital. The sides grant each 
other most-favoured-nation status in trade and the absence of discriminations concerning 
goods, labour conditions and the establishment of companies. This regime is much less open 
than that offered by association agreements. However, the PCA with Russia is oriented 





5.2 The Concept of Establishing CEES  
One of the stated goals of the PCA between the EU and Russia was “to create the necessary 
conditions for the future establishment of a free trade area between the Community and 
Russia covering substantially all trade in goods between them, as well as conditions for 
bringing about freedom of establishment of companies, of cross-border trade in services and 
of capital movements”. In 1998 it was planned to study the question of whether the time was 
ripe for beginning talks on the FTA. 
The goal of “Russia’s integration into a common European economic and social area” was 
formulated in the Common Strategy of the EU on Russia (June 1999), which refers to “the 
future establishment of an EU-RF free-trade area” and subsequently of the Common 
European Economic Space (CEES) as a result of gradual approximation of legislation and 
standards. The 2002 saw an event which may become crucial for the development of post-
Communist Russia. The EU put forward the idea to establish of a Common European 
Economic Space: 
“The concept of a Common European Economic Space will help us create a long-term 
strategy for economic cooperation. It means bringing Russia and the Union closer by 
establishing a compatible legislative base and eliminating technical barriers to trade and 
investment”(Romano Prodi). 
This long term initiative is already conducted by High-Level Group (HLG) established 
in accordance with Article 93 of the PCA at the Brussels Summit on October 3, 2001 and led 
by Commissioner Patten on the EU side and Deputy P.M. Khristienko for Russia. The task of 
the High-Level Group which task is to define the core elements which will need to be put in 
order to create a Common European Economic Space and to elaborate a concept for close 
economic relationship between Russia and the EU. Moreover,  the High-Level Group 
considers the opportunities offered by greater economic integration and legislative 
approximation and assesses options for further work. It also identifies means and mechanisms 
to achieve common objectives and consider the time-scale for implementation. In its work, 
the High-Level Group does not replace or duplicate the activities of the cooperation bodies 
created within the PCA because the CEES is broader and deeper in comparison to the WTO 
and PCA provisions. However, the High-Level Group fully takes into consideration the 
obligations that result from the current or future participation of the parties in the World 
Trade Organization. The outcome of discussions in the High-Level Group is brought to the 
attention of relevant PCA bodies, including summits. If necessary experts of both sides could 
be invited to take part in the work of the Group. 
The HLG also took into consideration the ongoing economic reform process in Russia as 
well as developments in the EU Internal Market. For making the concept operational, the 
objectives set out above will need to be transformed into specific goals and actions by way of 
action plans. The elaboration of the Action Plans and respective negotiations will be provided 
under guidance and coordination of the High Level Group. The HLG will report progress to 
the EU-Russia Summit on a regular basis. Where, however, the envisaged content of an action 
plan calls for a negotiation to be done, both sides will use their internal rules and principles 
for preparing and conducting such negotiations should be provided, as was mentioned, under 
negotiating mechanisms between both sides will be the usual ones. In such cases, the relevant 
action plan would need to be made a bilateral agreement, to be formalised by way of Protocol 
attached to the PCA or to take the form of a self-standing agreement as the case may require.  
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The High-Level Group has met five times to develop the concept. At its second meeting in 
March 2002, the HLG adopted a work plan for 2002/2003, including the task of assessing the 
potential impact of a CEES. A first Report of the HLG was made to the EU-Russia Summit 
on 29 May 2002. A number of studies have been commissioned by the Parties to assess the 
CEES’ impact, both on the economy as a whole and across a range of its sectors. The list 
includes sectors where cooperation boosts trade and investment and where the trade interest 
of the EU and Russia is strong, such as: standards, technical regulations and conformity 
assessment, customs, financial services, accounting/auditing, transport, space launching 
services, public procurement, telecommunications, competition, industry (inter alia, ferrous 
and non-ferrous metals sectors) and agriculture (inter alia, the sectors of meat and meat 
products, grain production). It also reflects the achievements and experience of integration in 
the EU. In its report to the Summit in November 2002, the HLG noted with satisfaction that 
preliminary results of these studies are positive. At the Summit in St. Petersburg in May 2003, 
the EU and Russia reiterated their intention to reinforce co-operation on a number of issues, 
including the placing of the CEES project into the broader context of four Common Spaces 
(economic space; space of freedom, security and justice; space of common external security; 
space of science, research, education and culture) to be created in the long-term.  
The EU-Russia Summit in November 2003 gave the more detailed idea of what the 
Common European Economic Space (CEES) may be. In Annex I. to Concept Paper the 
definition, rationale and objectives of functioning CEES are described. It says that the CEES 
means an open and integrated market between the EU and Russia, based on the 
implementation of common or compatible rules and regulations, including compatible 
administrative practices, as a basis for synergies and economies of scale associated with a 
higher degree of competition in bigger markets. It shall ultimately cover substantially all 
sectors of economy (THE EC DELEGATION IN RUSSIA 2004). The CEES aims are: 
•  promoting trade and investment between the EU and Russia, based on well-
functioning market economies; 
•  creating opportunities for business operators through common, harmonised or 
compatible rules and regulations, as well as through inter-connected infrastructure 
networks; 
•  enhancing the competitiveness of the EU and Russian economies worldwide. 
The CEES concept covers both horizontal and sectoral targets. A number of areas for 
action have already been considered for action and other sectors/issues shall be added as 
appropriate. 
The CEES shall focus on eliminating obstacles and creating opportunities in four main 
areas of economic activity, i.e. cross-border trade of goods and trade in services, including 
relevant regulatory standards and requirements; establishment and operation of companies, 
related aspects of movement of persons, in the relevant fields of economic activity. 
The main instruments to be applied in these areas are market opening (gradual removal 
of obstacles to trade and investment between the EU and Russia), regulatory convergence, 
and trade facilitation (simplification, standardisation and automation of trade procedures). In 
all of these areas, the Parties shall promote closer and more structured permanent relations 
between their respective institutions, whether public or private (THE EC DELEGATION IN 
RUSSIA 2004).  
Currently, attitudes toward such an integration are becoming increasingly positive both in 
EU and in Russia. There is strong believe that the Common European Economic Space is 
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as well as trade and investment facilitation may create substantial benefits for both the EU 
and Russia, not least in permitting economic agents to operate subject to common rules and 
conditions and boosting business and investor confidence in the predictability and 
transparency of rules. However, economic integration between the two partners is not an end 
in itself: giving it a further boost will enhance general prosperity on both sides, improve the 
standards of living, increase the protection of human health and well-being as well as of the 
environment, and ultimately serve the purpose of political stability in the region and world-
wide.  
The concept of the CEES between the EU and Russia aims at injecting similar integrating 
dynamics, which, as in the EEA go, far beyond trade liberalization (SAMSON 2002).  At the 
nigh Summit on 29 May 2002 in Moscow was said that at the heart of CEES lays the notion 
that Russia would use the present economic reform program to make its own laws and 
regulations compatible with EU’s. The EU for the first time has stated in the European 
Commission's communication ‘Wider Europe’ that the bases for tightening co-operation 
between the EU and its neighbours include not only democratic and free-market changes in 
those countries, but also the gradual acceptance by them of legal solutions binding on the 
Union itself. 
If the main future of this idea is the implementation of a Single Market between Russia 
and EU and ensuring the four fundamental freedoms - free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital. That means that this closer association between the EU and Russia will 
impose on Russia requirements and the adoption of the Maastricht and Copenhagen 
criteria, as well as special reports by the European Commission (evaluating the degree of 
preparedness of individual some countries) for more detailed targets to be developed for 
Russia. More generally, it can be said in the light of the EEA experience that harmonization 
of legislation becomes a necessity sooner or later, even in fields that were excluded from the 
original agreement, since benefits from the Single Market are not fully exploited. 
Remaining within the economic framework, adaptation of European standards should be 
undertaken primarily in the following areas:  
•  existence of a functioning market economy;  
•  ability to secure effective competition and operation of market forces (deregulation 
and establishment of competitive conditions, legislative stability and transparency of 
fiscal policy);  
•  implementation of structural reform with a focus on protection of property rights, 
effectiveness of bankruptcy legislation, efficiency of the tax system, stability of the 
banking sector, and of financial markets;  
•  monetary and fiscal policies to promote steady growth;  
•  establishment of administrative and government institutions in line with European 
standards. 
Building in Russia market institution as the first condition for launching an integration 
dynamic within the CEES will intensify mutual flows of trade and investments. 
Financial standards are specified by the Maastricht agreements (SAMSON 2002): 
•  price stability: annual inflation within 1.5 percentage points of the three best 
performing EU countries;  
•  annual government deficit not to exceed 3% of GDP;  
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•  debt: total outstanding government debt not to exceed 60% of GDP;  
•  exchange-rate stability, meaning that for at least 2 years the country concerned has 
kept within the “normal” fluctuation margins of 2.5% envisaged by the European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism;  
•  average nominal long term interest rate must be within 2 percentage points of the 
average rate in the three countries with the lowest inflation rates. 
There are still many points that need to be further spelled out and clarified in these 
proposals. The conclusion that European standards should be used applied, requires some 
qualification. All the existing vagueness and lack of detail, as well as technical and legal 
problems, which in practical implementation of this idea may bound to encounter, depend on 
the development of key institutional guidelines for the socio-economic transformation of 
Russia. It is precisely the adaptation to Russian conditions of European institutions that is also 
the aim of the Strategic Program to 2010. The level of economic development and education, 
GDP structure, the social structure of population, and for that matter the current political 
system, make the choice of European standards the most natural and appropriate. Of the 
special importance today are: the complex of goals relating to macroeconomic conditions, 
fulfilment of the criteria associated with the establishment of a functioning market economy, 
transformation, ability to secure effective competition and operation of market forces, 
successfully completed domestic reforms and adaptation of standards laws and regulations 
compatible with EU (which may also help Russia to receive status of “market economy”). 
The broad adoption of the acquis communautaire in six chapters, is based on directives that 
have to be transcribed into national laws, and regulations that have to be implemented. 
Therefore, administrative reform building for enforcement and implementation of laws and 
unification of the internal Russian market is also of interest, because without these changes 
the CEES will not be able to function properly and the quick shift towards a sustainable 
growth model will not happen. In Russia this issue is important, not alone at the federal level, 
but also because of the current practices of regional authorities. Without also a prior 
improvement of the business climate, company law and competition policy, 
demonopolising the banking sector or creating the conditions of freedom of establishment and 
service provision, the positive impact of broad liberalization measures in the movement of 
goods and services cannot produce all its effects. As regards existing cooperation several 
other issues offer scope for initiating or deepening cooperation they include: transport, 
fishing, telecoms and IT. Employment and social policy is a field, which has priority for 
Russia and in which the EU has extensive experience. Another special field for new 
cooperation is the internal and external use of the euro by Russia. There is also a broad field 
of discussion between the two parties for defining the free movement of persons between the 
EU and Russia. This was also stressed by EU commissioner Chris Patten during the Moscow 
Summit of December 3, 2001. Free movement of persons is the highest confidence that the 
EU can give Russia and although it seems to be nowadays unrealistic perhaps within the 
CEES it will be possible. If a strong and efficient impulse is given to the creating of a CEES 
between the EU and Russia, with strong investment activity and an economic growth in 
Russia, the prospect of free movement of persons may seem to be realistic. 
Russia’s accession to the WTO and the OECD (formal application to the OECD was 
filed as long ago as 1996) are natural stations on the way to the European-type 
institutions. Russia’s  accession  to the WTO, which is meant to contribute to the major 
political and economic objective or integrating Russia into the world trading system, may help 
to strengthen the bilateral economic co-operation between Russia and the EU, and together 
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trade and investment, thus paving the way for the creation or a Common European Economic 
Space. Nevertheless some experts are in the opinion that it may not be right to focus first on 
WTO accession, but on building CEES. As WTO accession is a huge task, the CEES process 
may wait for a long time for the outcome of the WTO discussion, another reason is that the 
lack of an institutional framework based on the impulse provided by the acquis might unable 
Russia to get the full benefit of economic opening and other advantages associated with WTO 
accession 
All above criteria and the macroeconomic convergence would make Russia’s economic 
integration with EU closer. However, these criteria should not be identified with the Russia’s 
goal of EU accession. Moreover, all of them should be applied to actual Russian realities and 
practices. As it happens, Russia is already ahead of the EU as regards some socio-economic 
decisions or institutions. This is true of the tax system, fiscal policy (orientation to a zero-
deficit budget), and labour legislation. It should also be recognized that Russia’s current 
agricultural policy (meaning essentially, the principles of relations between the government 
and the agricultural sector) is more efficiency-oriented than that of the EU. There should also 
be no formal alignment of Russian institutions with European ones if that were to impair 
Russia’s competitive advantages. There should be also standards developed in Russia and for 
Russia. There can be no question of parameters being developed jointly with the EU or under 
control of European entities. The idea is that Russia should determine its own targets and 
goals rather than formalize its desire to join the EU. For the first time since the collapse of 
Communism, Russian society may come to recognize and formulate its own long-term 
development path. If this is truly the case, then Russia will at one and the same time define 
criteria for appraising politico-economic decisions and results of their implementation. The 
discussion of options for the CEES should also take into account the greater economic 
distance between the EU and Russia compared with that between that EU and CEE countries. 
This is first reflected by levels of economic development, but also by economic history and 
the late and young capitalism that appeared in Russia at the end of the 19th century. Russia is 
neither an EFTA nor a CEE country. Its national specifies, both geographical and historical, 
must be taken into consideration, as well as the specific features of its society. Moreover the 
CEES concept should take into account Russia's specific situation, and the asymmetry caused 
by its low per capita GDP and institutional development. Russia's per capita GDP is lower 
than average CEE countries, and of course much lower than EFTA countries when the EEA 
was created in 1992. This fact should be taken into account when discussing the the CEES 
and the transition phases, which Russia would need in adopting the acquis. The CEES may be 
the best tool for quickly reducing the asymmetry.   
In the end of my paper I would like to present as a counterbalance to what was said above 
also a totally different view of establishing Common European Economic Space. 
Shemiatenkov, the Principal Research Fellow at the Institute of Europe in Moscow and 
former Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the EU, noted that contrary to neo-liberalist 
economic theory, Russia would not benefit from open borders with the rest of the world. 
Instead of exporting their products, Russian manufacturers will want to use their advantages 
in their home market and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). As prospects for 
the free trade area become uncertain, so too do the chances of Russia's approximation with the 
European Union. In the meantime, it has become clear that Russia will not become a part of 
Europe. "The dream we had twelve years ago has been torpedoed," Mr Shemiatenkov said, 
adding that there were no economic reasons for establishing a free trade area. "Now this 
bridge has been closed." While some of Russia's western provinces would clearly benefit 
from closer economic ties with western Europe, Mr Shemiatenkov underlined that the eastern 
provinces have much more to gain from trade with Asia. A free trade arrangement with  
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Western Europe will further aggravate trade relations within the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. And, last but not least, unrestricted trade policy freedom may give the re-
emerging Russian economy a better chance to tap the new opportunities created by 
globalisation. In the latter case it would be only reasonable to re-visit the Partnership and Co-
operation Agreement and consider the feasibility of other possible forms of co-existence with 
Western Europe. For instance, if there is no prospect of joining the Union in the foreseeable 
future, the idea of creating a free trade area becomes rather unattractive. It will certainly give 
unilateral advantages to EU manufacturers and may seriously hinder the renaissance of the 
crisis-striken Russian industry. It may exacerbate the conflict of interests between European 
particularly north-western Russian regions, on the one hand, and the Russian Far East and 
Eastern Siberia which seem to be gravitating to the Pacific Rim (SHEMIATENKOV 2000).  
Many options remain open for the CEES concept and its main features and elements, 
which are less precise and same times less binding. However, most opinions are in favour to  
establishing CEES. Through the building of a CEES and anchoring of Russia's economic 
growth and institutional change to the European Union, the world's biggest economy, will 
allow rapid changeover to a strong and sustainable growth model in Russia. If developments 
follow a favourable scenario, Russia’s position in Europe could, in a strategic perspective, be 
similar to the current partnership between the EU and Norway (looking here to the precedent 
rather than to specific forms). The creation of Common European Space between Russia and 
European Union, is the most important concept nowadays between EU and RF which may 
allow Russia to enhance its economy and take full advantages of EU Eastern Enlargement. 
Therefore, the basis for the discussion and for the success of the implementation process 
should be of mutual interest.  39 
Appendix 1 : The Impact of Market Integration - A Comparative 
Statistic Analysis using a Simplified Model (GOTO, 1995) 
Three simplifying assumptions: 
•  Three countries. Country 1 and Country 2 are the prospective member countries (e.g. 
France and Germany), and the country 3 is the outside country (e.g.Russia) 
•  The same economic size. The factor endowments of the three countries (Li) are 
assumed to be the same. 
•  The symmetric tariff. The levels of the external tariffs of the three countries are 
assumed to be the same. 
 
I. Equilibrium before Integration 
Adding the above three simplifying assumptions, let us examine the possible impact of the 
EU integration on Russia. By assumption 2, the following equality holds: 
(1)  () L L L L = = = § 2 1 , 
By assumption 3, equation (2) holds in the equilibrium before country 1 and country 2 are 
integrated, where tiM, tjM, and tkM are tariff rate in country M imposed on good produced in 
country 1,2, and 3, respectively: 
(2)  () t tk tkl tj tjl ti ti = = = = = = 2 § 3 2 , 
Note that after the integration, ti2 and tj1 become zero. 
Further, it should be noted that, when the above three assumptions are adopted, the 
analysis becomes much less complicated due to the symmetry of the problem. The following 
relations are especially useful for the analysis. In what follows, PiM, PjM, and PkM are the 
prices quoted in country M of the goods produced in country 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and 
CiM, CjM, and CkM are the amounts of consumption in country M of the differentiated products 
produced in country 1, 2, and 3, respectively. 
(3)  3 2 1 Pk Pj Pi = =  ( ; Ph =  price of home goods), 
(4)  3 2 1 W W W = =  ( W = ; W  will be set to unity), 
(5)  , 3 2 1 l l l l = = =  ( ; l =  labor input of each firm), 
(6)  3 2 1 n n n n = = =  ( n = ; the number of firms of each country), 
(7) 2 3 3 2 Pk Pkl Pj Pjl Pi Pi = = = = =  ( Pf = ; price of foreign goods), 
(8) 3 2 Ck Cj Cil = =  (; Ch =  consumption of home goods), 
(9) 2 3 3 2 Ck Ckl Cj Cjl Ci Ci = = = = =  (; Cf =  consumption of foreign goods) 
(10)  3 2 1 Y Y Y = =  (; Y =  national income), 
With the above symmetry relations, the equilibrium conditions before integration reduce 
to the following: 
(11)  β / m Ph =  
(12)  () , / 1 β t m Pf + =   
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(13)  () ( ) 0 2 1 / 2 = + − − + + Cf Ch m F t PfCf PhCh  
(14)  () , 2Cf Ch m F l + + =  
(15)  L nl =  
(16) , 2 Y tPhCfn L = +  
(17) , /




1 Z Y C Pf f
− =
β  
(19)  ( ), 2 f h C C n Z
β β + =  
In order to obtain the equilibrium values of endogenous variables, the system of the above 
equations should be solved. The following simplifying expressions for the equilibrium values 
of all endogenous variables is obtained: 
(20) , /β m Ph =  
(21)  () , / 1 β t m Pf + =  
(22)  () , 1 / β − = F l  
(23)  (), / 1 F L n β − =  
(24)  () [] {} ( )
( ) [ ] { }
β β β
− − + + − =
1 1 1 2 1 / 1 1 / t m F Ch , 
(25)  [] {} ( )
( ) [ ] { } , 1 2 / 1 1 ( /
1 / 1 β β β
− + + − = t m F C f  
(26)  ()
() [ ] [ ] { } , 1 2 / 2 1
1 / 1 L t t Y
β − + + + =  
(27)  () [] {} ( )
() [] {} { } , 2 1 2 1 / 1 1 /
1 / 1 β β β β β + + + − =
− − t m F n Z  
It should be noted that several interesting relationships in the above equilibrium 
conditions can be observed. From equations (24) and (25), the following derivative conditions 
hold:  
(28) , 0 / > ∂ ∂ t Ch  
 
(29)  , 0 / < ∂ ∂ t Cf  
Namely, when tariff rate increases, the consumption of borne goods increases while that 
of foreign goods decreases. Further, comparing equation (24) with equation (25), we have 
(30)  Cf Ch >  when  0 > t , 







II. Equilibrium after Integration 
Now let examine what will happen if country 1 and country 2 are integrated. Here, integration 
means the lifting of tariffs between the two countries. Therefore, in order to obtain the 
equilibrium after integration, all we have to do is to plug equation (32) into the above 
specification before integration. 
(32)  0 2 = = jl i t t , 
It should be noted that in the equilibrium after integration, the neat symmetry conditions 
among the three countries no longer hold. However, the following relations still hold in 
equilibrium after integration. 
(33)  2 1 W W =  ( ; W = =W; but still  1 3 = W   1 3 = W , 
(34)  () , 2 2 PA Pjl Pi Pj Pil = = = =  
(35)  () , 3 3 PB Pj Pi = =  
(36)  () , 2 Pc Pk Pkl = =  
(37)  () , 2 2 CA Cjl Ci Cj Cil = = = =  
(38)  () , 3 3 CB Cj Ci = =  
(39)  () , 2 Cc Ck Ckl = =  
(40)  () , 2 l l lI = =  
(41)  () , 2 1 n n n = =  
(42)  () , 2 1 Y Y Y = =  
 
Using the above relations, the equilibrium conditions after integration of country l and 
country 2 can be expressed as follows: 
(43) , /β mW PA =  
(44)  () , / 1 β W t m PB + =  
(45)  () , / 1 β t m Pc + =  
(46)  β / 3 m Pk = , 
(47)  ( ) ( ) , 0 2 1 / 2 = + − − + + CB CA Wm WF t PBCB PACA  
(48)  () ( ) , 0 3 2 3 3 1 / 2 = + − − + + Ck Cc m F Ck Pk t PcCc  
(49)  () , 2 CB CA m F l + + =  
(50)  () , 3 2 13 Ck Cc m F + + =  
(51) , L nl =  
(52) , 3 L l n =  
(53)  (), 1 / 3 Y t Cc tPcn WL = + +  
(54)  () , 3 1 / 2 Y t nC tP L B B = + +  
(55) , /
1 Z Y C P A A
− =
β  
(56)  , /




1 Z Y C P B B
− =
β  
(58) , / 3 3
1
3 Z Y B P k k
− =
β  
(59) , 2 3 C A C n nC Z
β β + =  
(60)  , 2 3 3 3 k B C n nC Z
β β + =  
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By Walrus's law. one of the above 18 equations is redundant, so 17 independent equations 
determine the equilibrium values or 17 endogenous variables (PA, PB, PC, Pk3, CA, Ck3, CC, 
Ck3, W, l, l3, n, n3, Y, Y3, Z, Z3). Note that, due to the symmetry of the problem, Pk3 (and Ck3) 
are the same for all k. 
 
1. Impact on Production 
First of all, let examine how the production side is affected by the integration. Substituting 
equations (43) and (44) into equation (47), and rearranging the terms, we obtain 
(61)  () , 1 / 2 β β − = + m F C C B A  
Note that the left-hand side of equation (61) is equal to the amount or production by each 
firm in country 1 (and country 2) after integration. Similarly, substituting equations (43) and 
(44) into equation (48) and rearranging, we have 
(62)  () , 1 / 2 3 β β − = + m F C C k C  
Again note that the left-hand side of equation (62) is equal to the amount of production by 
each firm in country 3 after integration. 
Substituting equation (61) into equation (49), we obtain 
(63)  () , 1 / β − = F l  
Similarly, substituting equation (62) into equation (50), we get the following: 
(64)  () , 1 / 3 β − = F l  
Comparing equations (63) and (64) with equation (22), we know that the amount of labor 
input (and therefore the amount of production) of each firm after integration is exactly the 
same as that before integration. In other words, the production in each firm is not affected by 
the integration of country 1 and country 2. Furthermore, by substituting equations (63) and 
(64), respectively, into equations (51) and (52), we obtain the following: 
(65)  (), / 1 F L n β − =  
(66)  (), / 1 3 F L n β − =  
Comparing equations (65) and (66) with equations (23), we know that the number of firms 
in each country is not affected by the integration. That means the production side is not 
affected at all by the integration, and therefore, the problem reduces to the allocation of goods 
to each country. 
 
2. Impact on Wage Rate.  
Having shown that we find that the production configuration remains the same as that before 
integration, let us now examine the impact of the integration on other variables. Consider the 
impact on wage rate first. From equations (55)-(58), (62), and (63), we can derive equation 
(67) after tedious manipulation: 
(67) ()
() () ()
( ) ( ), 1 2 1 2 1
1 / 1 / 1 1 / 1 1 / 1 − − − − + + = + +
β β β β β W t W W t  
Although equation (67) looks complicated, note the following two points: 
•  the left-hand side of the equation is a monotonically increasing function of W, while 
the right-hand side is a monotonically decreasing function of W; and 
•  when W is equal to one, the left-hand side is smaller than the right-hand side. 43 
Therefore, from these two points, we know the following relationship: 
(68) , 1 > W  
Equation (68) shows that after integration, the wage rate in country 1 and country 2 is 
greater than that in country 3. 
 
3. Impact on Terms or Trade.  
Now, let examine the impact or integration on the terms of trade. The terms or trade of 
country 3 (i.e., or the outsider) is expressed as follows: 
(69) The terms of trade of country  B C P P / 3 = , 
Dividing equation (45) by equation (44), we obtain 
(70) , / 1 / W P P B C =  
From equations (68) and (70), we have 
(71) , 1 / < B C P P  
Since the terms of trade before integration equal 1, as is clear by the specification of the 
equilibrium before integration in the last section, equation (71) implies that the terms of trade 
of country 3 (outsider) worsens after the integration of country 1 and country 2. As is well 
known, a worsening of the terms of trade of outsiders has been pointed out by the traditional 
customs union theory based on imperfect competition and constant returns to scale. Here, 
equation (71) shows that the same result holds even under new framework. 
 
4. Impact on Consumption and Welfare. 
What would happen to the amount of consumption in each country after integration? From 
equations (55)-(58), we obtain 
(72)  , B C WC C =  
From equations (68) and (72), we obtain 
(73) , B C C C >  
Further, we already know that the amount or production in each firm does not change after 
integration. Therefore: 
(74) , 2 2 2 3 f h k B B A C C C C C C + = + = +  
From equations (73) and (74), we obtain 
(75) , 2 2 2 f h B A C A C C C C C C + = > +  
Equation (75) shows that the amount of consumption of  each member country increases 
after integration. The increase in consumption suggests that the utility levels also increase in 
member countries. By some tedious manipulation, we can rigorously prove that this is in fact 
the case.  
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Similarly, the impact on the consumption country 3 (outsider) can be determined. From 
inequality (73) and nothing that the amount of production remains unchanged after 
integration, we obtain the following relations: 
(76)  , 2 2 2 3 3 h f k C k B C C C C C C + = + < +  
As shown in equation (76), the amount of consumption (and the level of the utility) in the 
outsider country decreases after integration of the remaining two countries. 
 
5. Impact on Trade Pattern – Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 
Next, let’s examine the impact of economic integration on the pattern of trade. From 
equations (55)-(58), we can derive 
(77)  () (),
1 / 1
3 A k C W C
β β − + =  
From equations (57), (58), (70), and (77), we obtain 
(78) ()
() () , / 1 3
1 / 1 1 / 1
B k C C W t = +
− − β β  
Further from equations (24) and (25), we obtain the following equation: 
(79)  ()
( ), 1 /
1 / 1 β − + = t C C f h  
From equation (68) we already know that W is greater than one, and therefore, from 
equations (78) and (79), we have 
(80)  , 3 / / k B h f C C C C >  
Note that equation (80) implies 
if  h k C C < 3  then  B f C C >  
Further, note that equation (76) implies 
 
if  h k C C ≥ 3  then  B f C C > . 
  
From (i) and (ii), inequality (81) holds in all cases: 
(81) , f B C C <  
Note that CB is equal to the amount of exports from country 1 (or country 2) to country 3 
after the integration. Therefore, equation (81) shows that the amount of exports from 
members to the outsider is reduced by the integration. Furthermore, after tedious 
manipulation, we can show the following: 
(82) , f C C C <  
Also note that CC  that is equal to the exports from country 3 to country 1 ( or country 2) 
after the integration. Thus inequality (82) shows that the amount of exports from the outsider 
to each member country will be reduced by the integration. From inequalities (81) and (82), 
can be concluded that the amount of trade between the members and the outsider will decline 
after the integration (trade diversion) 45 
What would happen to the amount of trade between the member countries? As discussed 
above, since the amount of production by each firm does not change after integration, we 
have 
(83)  , 2 2 h f B A C C C C + = +  
Substituting equation (82) into inequality (79), we obtain 
(84)  ( ) , 2 / h f A C C C + >  
From equation (30), we already know Ch > Cf  ; therefore,    
(85)  f A C C > . 
Note that CA is equal to the amount of exports from country 1 (country 2) to country 2 
(country 1) after the integration. Therefore, inequality (85) shows that the amount of trade 





Established above a simple general equilibrium framework for the analysis of integration 
(e.g.within EU), is based on some new assumptions such as imperfect competition, increasing 
returns to scale, and product differentiation. Using the general equilibrium model, impact of 
integration mainly on the outside country have analysed. The main findings of this chapter 
and their implications are summarized and discussed below. 
 
1. Terms of Trade Effect 
After the integration, the terms of trade of the outsider worsens, unless there is an 
additional liberalization of the EU’s imports from the outside country. 
 
2. Trade Pattern Effect 
After the integration, the amount of trade between member countries increases (trade 
creation), but trade between the members and the outsider declines (trade diversion). This 
implies that after the completion of the EU single market, the trade between EU countries and 
the third country tends to decline, again unless trade liberalizing measures are taken by both 
the third and the EU countries. 
 
3. Consumption and Welfare Effect 
After the integration, the amount of consumption (as well as the utility level) of the 
outsider would decline, while those of the member countries would increase. This suggests 
that the third country would be adversely affected by the completion of the EU single market.  
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Appendix 2 : Tariff and Non –Tariff Barriers in Russia’s Trade 
Policy 
I. RUSSIA’S TARIFFS AND DUTIES 
Import Tariffs  
Import Tariffs are Russia's main trade policy instrument regulated by the Russian Federal 
Law "On the Customs Tariff". In November 2000, the government adopted a new four-tier 
system of customs duties that came into force on 1 January 2001. The tariff cuts sliced 
maximum rates from 30 to 20 %, but tariffs average at about 10 % (11% before the tariff 
reduction). The new four-tier run scale includes levels of 5, 10, 15 and 20 %. The major 
exception to the new system is automobile imports, which are subject to a special 25 % tariff, 
to protect the domestic car industry. However, this rate is lower than the previous 30 %. Other 
exceptions are poultry, sugar, spirit and tobacco. As Russia is not yet a Member of the WTO, 
it has not bound its tariff rates. Russia is currently negotiating the terms of its WTO accession. 
Russia's new import duty scale forms the cornerstone of the government's reform of the 
customs system, which aims to remove obstacles to Russia's WTO accession. 
 
Excise and VAT  
Russia has already taken steps to equalise the treatment of imported and domestically 
produced goods for the purposes of internal taxation. These are being assessed by the EU. 
 
Other tariffs and duties 
•  Consular fees 
Russia levies consular fees connected with imports or exports of goods or services which 
do not apply to all foreign companies on a non-discriminatory basis and do not appear to 
reflect always the actual cost of services rendered. Current differences in the level of charges 
applied by Russian consular offices in third countries do not appear justified. In many cases, 
including in relation to the certification and authentication of documents, the consular fees 
levied in the CIS and Baltic countries are ten times lower than those levied elsewhere. 
•  Wine tariffs 
The specific duties on alcoholic beverages (wines, Vermouths and other fermented 
beverages) have been replaced by 25 % ad valorem tariffs as from 1 April 2000, following 
decision No. 1365 of December 1999, of the Government of the Russian Federation, of 
9.12.1999. They have since been reduced to 20% ad valorem tariffs, as from 1 January 2001. 
The Russian side explained that this governmental decision was a response to the EU, World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund requirements to replace a number of tariff lines, 
for which duties were applied, with ad valorem duties. However the EU wine industry still 
complaints that, when compared to 1999 duty levels, this change in tariffs results in a global 
increase in duty for EU wines, in particular for higher value wines. The average ad valorem 
equivalent for EU exports, which would correspond to previous specific duties, is close to 
10%. Generally speaking, specific duties are more favourable to trade in quality wines, 
whereas ad valorem duties favour import of cheap wines. Besides, the introduction of ad 
valorem duties increases the incentive for fraud and under-declaration of the custom value. 47 
Thus these elements are particularly unfavourable for the EU wine exports, when compared to 




II. TRADE DEFENCE INSTRUMENTS 
The Russian Federal Law "On the Customs Tariff" provides the framework for the application 
of anti-dumping and countervailing duties and "special" duties to be applied as safeguard 
measures. Russia is preparing a range of new legislation in the area of trade defence 
instruments that should supersede existing legislation, as well as implementing regulations on 
procedures of investigation and for the determination of injury. These legislative proposals 
include a draft Federal Law on “Additions and Amendments to the Federal Law on Protection 
of Economic Interests of the Russian Federation in Foreign Trade in Goods”, a draft Federal 
Law on Safeguard, Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Measures applying to Imports of 
Products” and a draft Federal Law “on State Aid”. The PCA recognises that Russia is in 
transition to a full market economy. A special regime, therefore, exists in the field of trade 
defence instruments, whereby "normal value" of a product can be established outside Russia. 
However, a Russian firm in the course of an anti-dumping investigation may request 
individual market economy treatment if it can demonstrate that its exporting activities are 
determined by market forces. Both sides are allowed to take safeguard measures in cases 
where a product is imported under such conditions and quantities that it will cause or threaten 
to cause substantial injury to domestic producers. In the framework of the WTO, Russia 
should ensure that all legislation concerning this area in place at the time of her accession or 
implemented in the future is in full conformity with the relevant provisions of the relevant 
WTO Agreement. The Commission is, therefore, concerned that investigations undertaken by 
Russia and measures subsequently applied for the purposes of trade defence are not fully 
consistent with provisions under the PCA and WTO requirements. For example, under current 
legislation, anti-dumping investigations seem to be limited to injury and causality aspects, 
without requiring any proper determination of dumping, and subsequent measures are 
expected to remain in place for "a limited period of time necessary to eliminate the injury", 
which does not necessarily comply with the 5-year maximum duration of measures 
established in the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement. The EU has requested Russia to make 
firm commitments in the area of trade defence instruments during her WTO accession 
negotiations. As to safeguards, the Commission is particularly concerned about the recent 
increase in safeguard actions taken by Russia against EU exports. Russia has indeed initiated 
six new investigations between 2000 and 2001 and has thereby become one of the leading 
users of this instrument worldwide. The Commission considers that contrary to anti-dumping, 
safeguard measures concern fair trade and should therefore be an exception to trade 
liberalisation. It seems also that Russia has not always respected PCA provisions which 
provide for bilateral consultations prior to the introduction of definitive measures. While of 
course not contesting the right of Russia to use this instrument, the Commission expects that 
Russia takes the utmost care to respect bilateral obligations and given the fact that Russia is 
seeking to join the WTO, she would start WTO standards when taking action in the trade 
defence area. Four measures are currently in force (called “special measures” under Russian 
domestic legislation - one was just concluded with the imposition of definitive measures 
(potato and maize starch). Two investigations are currently ongoing (caramels and refrigerator 
parts). Given the size of the Russian market, most of these actions tend to have a significant 
impact on EU trade.   
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Caramels (safeguards)  
The investigation was initiated in February 2001 in respect of all third countries exporting 
to Russia. The product concerned is sugar confectionery (caramels, toffees and boiled 
sweets). A 6 month provisional safeguard measure was imposed in May 2001. With respect to 
the substance of the case, it should be pointed out that even though exports to Russia indeed 
increased from 1998-2000, the level of exports in 2000 is roughly the same as in 1997 in 
tonnage and lower in value. Definitive measures were announced in October with an offer to 
hold consultations. It should be noted that according to the definitive result of the 
investigation the EU share of total imports went down from 18.2% in 1998 to 6% in 2000, 
while imports from Ukraine increased from 68% to 92%. In addition, there was no reference 
to price undercutting by the EU which confirms the Commission's view that Ukraine is solely 
responsible for the low priced imports causing injury. Consultations with Russia on the 
provisional measures were held in September 2001 with no appreciable result. According to 
Article 17 PCA the EU has the right to a second round of consultations before Russia can 
introduce definitive measures.  
 
Refrigerator parts (compressors) (safeguards)  
The investigation was initiated in April 2001 in respect to all third countries exporting to 
Russia. On substance, it appears that the EC is the main exporter. However, according to 
Eurostat, EU exports were actually stable from 1998-2000 and even went down from 1999-
2000. Here again, the EU has the right to a second round of consultations before Russia can 




III. NON-TARIFF BARRIERS 
Restrictive customs clearance on certain border crossings 
Russia has also imposed restrictions that require customs clearance for certain goods, 
including textiles and clothing and electrical products, to take place only on border crossings 
with certain named Asian countries as well as in ports and airports. Consequently such items 
originating in Asia can no longer be exported to Russia via the EU. These decrees make it 
impossible for EU companies exporting to Russia to use raw materials from the Far East for 
sub-contracting and subsequently creates a barrier to EU-Russian business co-operation.  
The cumulative effect is that EU exporters to Russia face unpredictable, non-transparent, 
lengthy and generally burdensome customs procedures for imported goods at the point of 
entry into Russian customs territory. The EU accepts that appropriate checks on imported 
goods may be called for to ensure that Russian regulatory requirements are respected, but 
such measures should not be applied in a heavy-handed or non-transparent way. 
 
Inconsistencies/non-transparency of administrative decisions 
The EU industry and exporters have regular complained of inconsistencies between 
administrative decisions taken by Russian authorities and the prevailing Russian legislation. 
Moreover, inconsistencies exist between the general legislative framework and subsidiary 
regulations and administrative guidance issued by Russian government bodies (such as the 
State Customs Committee). Furthermore, administrative orders issued by the State Customs 49 
Committee are sometimes issued as “secret orders” and their contents are not publicised to 
traders. Under State Customs Committee Order No. 949 of 1 October 2001, certain goods 
qualified as high-risk (e.g. certain foodstuffs) are not released for free circulation without the 
specific approval of a "higher customs authority". The process of obtaining such approvals 
can last up to 1-2 weeks. Under rules introduced in October 2001 by the North Western 
Customs Authority, shipments of “risk products” (a wide group of products including coffee, 
furniture, tyres and washing machines) are subject to burdensome documentary requirements, 
including in relation to the ownership of the vehicle transporting the goods. 
 
Standards and Certification 
Most industrial sectors are affected by problems in the field of standards and certification 
as these problems are of a horizontal nature. The problems originate in the systems left over 
from the Soviet Union, and relate mostly to the erratic and contradictory Russian legal 
process, insufficient alignment with international standards, and an excessive use of pre-
market third party certification, resulting in high costs and considerable delays for European 
exporters. In addition, standards are often compulsory and very detailed, unlike in the EU, and 
mandatory third party certification applies for whole ranges of products for which self-
certification by the manufacturer is accepted in the EU. The application of standards and 
certification requirements lacks transparency, and is often arbitrary. Changes to the 
certification requirements are made frequently and not always sufficiently publicised. This 
combination of excessive testing, over-prescriptive requirements, high fees, considerable 
delays, untransparent application, and frequent changes constitutes one of the most serious 
barriers to market access for EU exporters to Russia. However, as foreseen in the Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), Russia has undertaken to reduce the differences between 
the EU’s system of standardisation and conformity assessment and its own by “encouraging 
the use of internationally agreed instruments in this field” (art. 60 PCA) and has also 
committed itself to “ensure that its legislation will be gradually made compatible with that of 
the Community”, notably in the field of “technical rules and standards” (art. 55 PCA). In 
addition, Russia’s bid to join the WTO implies in particular compliance with the agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). In this respect, Russia has drawn up at the end of 1997 
a TBT Action Plan and has accepted the following year a list of indicative commitments in 
the field of TBTs drawn up by the Commission. In spite of these commitments, progress is 
insufficient. Discussions between the Commission and the Russian authorities have been 
going on for several years on these matters, both in the PCA framework and in the context of 
WTO accession, and they have been backed up by significant technical assistance under the 
TACIS programme. Assistance in the area of harmonisation of standards has also been 
provided by the World Bank. Progress so far has been uneven. Whereas harmonisation of 
Russian standards with European and international standards is proceeding at a reasonable 
pace (35% in 2001, project of 45% in the years to come), there has been less progress on 
systemic issues. 
 
Progress to-date and main remaining problems  
With regard to standards, harmonisation with European and international standards has 
been progressing at a steady pace. However, a worrying element is the fact that Russia 
continues to ignore the distinction between compulsory technical regulations and voluntary, 
non compulsory standards. Instead, about 2000 State standards comprise some compulsory 
elements, while the rest is voluntary. This solution lacks transparency. Besides, in addition to 
‘State standards’ (and inter-State standards produced in the framework of the Euro-Asian  
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Inter-state Council for Standardisation, Metrology and Certification), there is a variety of 
other ‘standards’, such as branch standards, which are a heritage of the former Soviet system 
and whose legal status is unclear.  
With regard to conformity assessment, the main problem remains excessive reliance on 
mandatory third party certification, including for lower risk products which, in the EU, are 
subject to less stringent requirements, or are even not subject to any form of compulsory 
conformity assessment (registration or certification of 82% of products in Russia, 4% in EU – 
data from the EU industry). This is contrary to the TBT agreement’s principles of least trade-
restrictiveness and proportionality and to international practice, as well as unnecessarily rigid 
and costly for manufacturers. Russia has not engaged in a process of progressive reduction of 
the list of goods subject to compulsory third party certification although Gosstandart declared 
the intention to reduce the list of products subject to compulsory certification. The only 
positive but minor step in the right direction so far has been Decree 766 of 7 July 1999, which 
covers a limited number of products in particular in the textiles sector. It provides for a 
system of ‘conformance declaration’, which differs from manufacturer’s declaration as 
practised in the EU in that the declaration has to be registered with a conformity assessment 
body, which might leave some room for bureaucratic problems. It now seems that the new 
procedure is operational, but to what extent it actually constitutes a simplification would need 
to be confirmed by European business. Some industry representatives have already 
complained that the decree has very little impact. For those categories of goods for which the 
need for Third Party certification can be demonstrated, there should be a choice between 
product type approval and quality assurance.  
In order to ensure that consumers’ interests and rights are properly safeguarded an 
efficient market surveillance system coupled with appropriate product liability legislation 
should be introduced, especially since many low quality goods sold on open air markets are 
‘grey area’ products, which are not certified. The EU system could be used as a model. 
However, market surveillance arrangements are presently underdeveloped (ostensibly for 
financial reasons) and also uncoordinated, with responsibilities shared between several 
ministries and agencies. A related problem is that Russia does not have horizontal product 
liability/safety legislation along the lines of the 1985 and 1992 EU Directives. There are 
sectoral pieces of legislation, sometimes with extremely business-unfriendly provisions (e.g. 
the 1999 law on food hygiene and safety).  
The EU is also worried that Gosstandart continues to concentrate responsibilities in a 
variety of areas: standardisation, accreditation, conformity assessment, market surveillance (to 
the limited extent to which it is practised), supervisory and appeal functions, in addition to 
some regulatory and legislative responsibilities. This is in the Commission’s view inefficient 
and in contradiction with the EU system and with international practice. In addition, it lacks 
openness and transparency (e.g. consultation with industry and other stakeholders) and could 
also lead to conflicts of interest. At the moment, there does not seem to be any plans to 
change this situation.  
Another problem is that certification as operated under the responsibility of Gosstandart is 
often duplicated by testing requirements operated by various Ministries and agencies under 
various pretexts (public health, environment protection) but often in fact for funding purposes. 
The coordination between these bodies, which sometimes even have conflicting requirements 
(in contradiction with the TBT), is said to be non-existent. This is a very business-unfriendly 
situation that needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency by the Russian authorities, which 
should aim to set up a sort of “one-stop shop” system wherever feasible.  51 
With regard to the technical aspects of the implementation of the TBT Agreement, there 
are draft legislative texts on technical barriers to trade that cover these aspects.  
On accreditation, a draft text has been prepared but it does not provide for the 
establishment of a separate accreditation body: Gosstandart would be the responsible 
organisation. Indeed, a court decision has removed the possibility of accreditation for 
commercial non-governmental bodies.  
Another important aspect is the implementation of new rules. Significant efforts will be 
needed to achieve consistent and impartial implementation at the operational level. There are 
reports from the EU exporters that officials, notably at customs, often refuse to apply 
reformed rules, possibly because they are not aware of them.  
The last period of vigorous legislative activities in Russia led to a number of new 
requirements. However, industry complains that usually it was not given sufficient time to 
implement new legislation, which often requires serious changes in technological processes. 
(Example: New state standard GOST R 8.579-2001 introduced a new requirement regarding 
minimal level of filling for pre-packed goods (70%). The industry was not aware about this 
coming legislation and was not consulted on the new standard during its development. Time 
for implementation of the new requirement, which require changes in technologies and 




IV. RESTRICTIVE EXPORT MEASURES 
The Commission is extremely concerned about the proliferation of export restrictions 
imposed by Russia on a large number of products which gravely distort the EU trade and 
competition. Export restrictions from Russia are recurrent, are linked to frequently changing 
legislation and may vary in nature, ranging from export prohibitions, discriminating export 
licences to export duties. The latter vary in relation to the world market price and revenue 
objectives set by the government. Because these duties are applied on raw materials, their 
level is often prohibitive and can stop trade completely. 
 
Export Taxes 
•  Discriminating export duties 
Russia has maintained export duties on a wide number of products. Under Order N° 710 
of 23 July 2001 of the State Customs Committee of the Russian Federation, Russia has again 
increased such duties and extended their scope, covering 154 headings of the Harmonised 
System, at rates up to 50% (on products where the duty is expressed in ad valorem terms) and 
500€ per tonne (on products where the duty is levied on a specific basis). The level of these 
export duties is extremely high for certain products, i.e. ferrous scrap: an ad valorem 15% 
duty (but not less than 15€ per tonne); non ferrous metal scrap: an ad valorem 30% to 50% 
duty (but not less than 105€ to 1200€ per tonne); energy products: ranging from 30.5€ to 40 € 
per tonne; hides and skins: ranging from 60€ to 500 € per tonne; wood products: an ad 
valorem 5% to 10% duty (but not less than duty ranging from 2.5€ to 24€ per m
3).The effect 
of these duties is to subsidise the domestic downstream processing industry and to 
discriminate against foreign buyers. For many of the products affected, the effect of the duties 
is to discriminate against foreign buyers and to raise the level of the export price so that third-
country producers (i) encounter their own difficulties of supply for the products concerned,  
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(ii) suffer from increased production costs resulting e.g. from higher input or energy costs 
and/or (iii) face a situation where they lose relative competitiveness on the global market for 
downstream products as a result of the indirect price support given to domestic Russian 
producers competing in the same markets. This is particularly the case as a result of export 
duties on minerals, petrochemicals, natural gas, raw hides and skins, metals including non-
ferrous metals and scrap, wood products and log, etc. Consultations on this issue are engaged 
between the European Commission and Russia both in the framework of the relevant fora 
under the PCA and of the ongoing negotiations on Russia´s WTO accession. 
•  Discriminating export licensing 
•  Export subsidies 
Dual prices in the energy sector 
In addition to very high export taxes on oil and gas products (varying in relation to the 
world market price and revenue objectives set by the Government), Russia practices dual 
prices in the energy sector which make energy artificially cheap for the domestic processing 
industry, and discriminate heavily against foreign buyers. These practices are highly 
discriminating and are not applied by other trading partners. The Commission and the 
European industry consider that the effect of dual pricing in energy is to contribute to an 
indirect subsidisation of Russian industrial producers and services suppliers, as they do not 
have to pay a full market price for their energy inputs. This is particularly the case in energy 
intensive sectors (i.e. fertiliser, non-ferrous metals, steel, and others), where energy can 
account for a significant share of the price of the final product. This leads to a potential 
situation of dumping of downstream products once they are exported. The whole situation has 
implications for the ability of imported goods to compete on the Russian market and can lead 
to a displacement of EU products from third country markets. Exported goods from Russia 
also benefit from subsidised transport charges, particularly for transportation by rail. The EU 
understands however that Russia has recently taken steps to ensure that import/export cargoes 
are transported to/from Russian ports through the territory of Russia according to the 
domestic tariffs and that it intends to extend the same principle to all import/export cargoes 
to/from all frontier points in the near future. 




V. INVESTMENT RELATED BARRIERS 
Although Russia has made great strides over the past two years, in building up the political 
will to develop and then implement sweeping market reforms, much remains to be done, with 
some reforms still on the drawing board and others on the statute book but not yet in place on 
the ground. The general feeling among EU investors is that the activities of private business 
are still severely over-regulated. There is still a lack of predictability in the operating 
environment for foreign companies, with overlapping or contradictory legislation and/or 
administrative competencies, which constitutes a major barrier to investment. Other 
difficulties routenely experienced by EU companies in gaining recourse to the Russian legal 
system for redress and/or enforcement of legal judgements also still act as a brake on 
investment, so as does tax levels, corruption and the extent, whether perceived or actual, of 
activity by organised criminal gangs in the Russian economy. A recent study, carried out by 
the World Bank (FIAS) confirms that across the regions, the most often quoted Russia-
specific obstacles hindering business development remain : (i) the lack of a functioning 53 
secondary private market for land, in particular the observation that regional governments 
tend to abuse the role of the state as the most important land owner to intervene in investment 
decisions; (ii) the tax regime, in particular the discretionary power imbedded in tax inspectors, 
since it is possible for the tax authorities to define arbitrary revenue targets and to enforce 
them with fines and penalties, as an angle to interfere with business decisions; and (iii) 
obstacles faced by Russian as well as foreign business which are internationally active : next 
to the cumbersome regulations enforcing export revenue surrender requirements, reference is 
typically made to delays and corruption of the customs administration. The EU has urged 
Russia to consider setting a clear deadline for achievement of the following reforms, which it 
considers would contribute to Russia's own objective to promote greater investment within a 
stable, transparent and non-discriminatory framework:  
•  relaxation of existing limits on foreign investment in certain economic sectors (e.g. 
insurance, aircraft, energy, alcoholic drinks); 
•  improved corporate governance, with legislation to define and enforce property 
rights, especially those of minority shareholders. (The draft Corporate Conduct Code 
is a step in the right direction); 
•   reasonable, transparent and predictable tax laws;  
•  open registration of real estate;  
•  speedy bankruptcy procedures;  
•  a high level of protection of intellectually property rights (IPR).  
To have full impact, these changes will need to be accompanied by international 
accounting and auditing standards, including disclosure if share ownership , the absence of 
which currently provides a disincentive to enter into joint ventures with Russian companies. 
In the ongoing negotiations on Russia's WTO accession, the EU has requested that sub-federal 
legislation, regulations and measures that would be in contradiction to Russia’s WTO 
commitments need to be revised, annulled or otherwise brought into coherence with WTO 
commitments, in order to ensure the security and predictability of access to the Russian 
market. 
 
Direct foreign investment limitation 
•  Local content limitation 
The law "on Production Sharing"¨ places obligations on foreign investors to ensure 70% 
of local content for production and other equipment used in energy exploration, production 
and distribution projects.  
•  Insurance - Ownership restrictions 
The Russian insurance legislation, the Federal Law No.204-F3 of 20 November 1999 “on 
the Introduction of Changes and Additions in the Law of the Russian Federation on the 
Organisation of Insurance in the Russian Federation" introduced several stringent restrictions 
on the access of foreign insurers to the Russian market. The main one is the prohibition for 
companies with foreign shareholding above 49% to undertake in Russia life insurance, 
compulsory insurance schemes, compulsory State insurance, insurance of property related to 
the implementation of deliveries or contractual services for State needs and insurance of 
property-related interest of State-owned and municipal organisations. Other restrictive 
provisions pertain to the introduction of a quota limiting at 15% the aggregate foreign  
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participation in the total charter capital of Russian insurance companies, the reservation of the 
functions of single executive body and chief accountant to Russians citizens, the payment of 
foreign shares in charter capital, the advance permission to increase charter capital, the 
requirement of 2 years of experience on the Russian insurance market, reserves and ratio 
between assets and obligations. Those conditions are hardly soothed by a grandfathering 
clause that is unclear. The European Commission particularly regrets the current restrictions 
on the activities of EU investment funds, especially the 49% limit on the shareholding and the 
impossibility to obtain licences for investment in foreign currency denominated assets and for 
collective investment schemes. The Commission considers that the Russian 1999 Law on 
insurance breaches the EU/Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) . During 
numerous intensive consultations with the Russian authorities, the Commission has repeatedly 
urged Russia to comply with their PCA commitments in insurance. No satisfactory progress 
has been achieved so far. Consultations on this issue are going on.  
 
Foreign equity limitation in the aviation sector 
Russian legislation currently limits to 25 % any foreign equity participation in the aviation 
sector. 
•  Tax discrimination 
Services-transport 
The Siberian overflight charges, which date back to the Soviet era, have been a 
longstanding market access issue between the EU and Russia . Indeed, EU airlines flying 
routes over Siberia (to and from the Far East) are required to conclude so-called "commercial 
agreements" with the Russian national carrier Aeroflot, as a precondition to receive approval 
for those operations by the Russian authorities. Based on these imposed agreements, the 
European airlines, members of the Association of European Airlines, are forced to pay, as a 
condition "sine qua non" to overfly Siberia, € 220 million per year to subsidise their Russian 
competitor Aeroflot. The Russian side seeks to justify such charges as a form of 
"compensation" to Aeroflot for not using specific routes, or for not being required to land in 
Moscow (something which Aeroflot would have to do if it were operating the same routes), 
thus allowing the foreign airline to save the airport fees. The "compensation" payments that 
must be agreed upon with Aeroflot bear no economic relationship with actual costs, but are 
calculated in a way which ensures that using the Siberian space is still cheaper for foreign 
airlines than to circumvent it. The high amount imposed by the Russian measure has a heavily 
discriminatory character and is detrimental to the competitiveness of EU airlines. In addition, 
Russia has recently authorised transit services over Siberia without charging for transit to 
airlines from US, Canada, and Asian carriers (for the new North-South Cross-Polar routes 
between North America and South Asia). This aggravating fact of discrimination between 
trade partners amounts to disregarding MFN principle 55 
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